Opening contribution…
Opening contribution…
stray_bourse_59524 October 2026
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AI summary · What this changes
Two instances of "authorisation" changed to American English spelling "authorization" in the Market Access & Economic Opportunity pillar.
This proposal changes British English spelling to American English spelling in two locations within the Market Access & Economic Opportunity pillar. The first change replaces "authorisation" with "authorization" in a scoring level description about non-bank provider categories. The second change replaces "Authorisation" with "Authorization" in the heading "Provider Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways". These are wording-only edits with no substantive changes to requirements, definitions, or scoring criteria.
Author’s reasonIf the website is meant to use standard American English spelling throughout (as opposed to British English), spelling of this word needs to be updated.
On the board and under discussion. Nothing in the methodology has changed.
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01 · Edit
lightly edited · 1 word out, 1 word in
No Removed: authorisationAdded: authorization category for non-bank providers, or de facto prohibition; only banks may provide core services and no partnership pathway exists.
Full recorded document context, including this proposal’s other changes. Surrounding passages use their current wording. Edits against older wording are marked separately.
Preview only. Red strikethrough marks removals; green underlining marks additions. Unchanged passages remain in place.
Whether getting in is a defined process with published requirements, timelines, and appeal rights, or a negotiation whose terms depend on who is asking.
This is the largest pillar because it covers everything between a firm deciding to enter a market and that firm operating in it. Requirements, evidence, fees, decision timelines, licence tiers, refusal reasons, appeals, recognition of foreign authorisation, and access to supervisory testing arrangements.
The failure it detects is not strictness. A jurisdiction is entitled to set a high bar. The failure is opacity: requirements that exist but are not written, timelines quoted informally, and outcomes that vary between applicants who look the same on paper. Where that happens, incumbents and well advised entrants are advantaged over everyone else, and the regulator loses the ability to defend its own decisions.
Economic opportunity is the reason the pillar is scored this way. Every undocumented requirement is a cost paid by the applicants least able to absorb it.
Covers the full requirement set an applicant must meet, determination periods and published performance against them, licence tiers with measurable thresholds, written reasons for refusal and an independent appeal route. Excludes how high the bar is set, company formation outside the financial regime, and commercial viability.
Market Access & Economic Opportunity assesses everything between a firm deciding to enter a market and that firm operating in it: requirements, evidence, fees, decision timelines, licence tiers, refusal reasons, appeals, recognition of foreign authorisation, and access to supervisory testing arrangements.
The failure this pillar detects is not strictness. A jurisdiction is entitled to set a high bar. The failure is opacity, because every undocumented requirement is a cost paid by the applicants least able to absorb it.
The complete requirement set an applicant must meet, and the evidence standard for each
Determination periods, clock rules, and published performance against them
Licence tiers defined by measurable thresholds, and the transition between them
Written reasons for refusal, and an appeal route independent of the decision line
Terms on which supervisory testing arrangements are granted
Recognition and equivalence arrangements, and the notice given before withdrawal
The height of the bar, which is a policy choice for the jurisdiction
Company formation and tax registration outside the financial regime
Commercial viability of any particular business model
Authorisation requirements published in full
Decision timelines and reported performance
Proportionate licence tiers
Refusal reasons and appeal rights
Recognition of foreign authorisation
Weights are a starting point. The working group may revise them with documented rationale, which means they are open to an edit too.
Where a regulator publishes a determination period but not its performance, the assessment reads the commitment and notes the absence rather than estimating the reality.
Requirements communicated only in pre-application meetings are invisible to a documentary assessment, which is precisely the failure this pillar is trying to surface.
Nine indicators. This is the canonical text. Select any passage to propose an alternative.
Pillar definition
Rules Clarity & Comprehensiveness (RCC) measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech‑relevant rules are:
Findable and understandable (“clarity”), and complete enough to cover common fintech activities and risks (“comprehensiveness”), in a way that a regulated firm, or prospective entrant, can determine what licence it needs, what obligations apply, and how to comply, using publicly available materials.
This is not a “friendliness” or deregulatory score. It does not reward laxity; it rewards clarity, coherence, and coverage of the fintech rulebook itself.
Scope and boundaries
In scope (fintech‑relevant rule corpus):
Primary laws and regulations covering:
Core: Payments / payment systems / e-money Banking / lending / credit Securities / investment / advice / management Insurance Digital assets: custody, issuance of crypto tokens / asset tokenisation / stablecoins, crypto‑asset services (if applicable) Subareas within core: Regtech / suptech Digital banking / fintech licensing / regulation digital lending / BNPL Roboadvisory / automated trading Financial infrastructure / trading systems Data analytics / AI Internal IT systems Crowdfunding (if applicable)
Cross‑cutting supervisory requirements that materially affect fintech operations, including:
Core: AML/CFT / (e)kyc Data protection Data use / portability / consent in financial services Identity Subareas: Outsourcing / cloud Cybersecurity Operational resilience Safeguarding of funds Market conduct requirements
Out of scope:
Ecosystem outcomes (e.g. investment levels, number of fintechs). Enforcement “toughness” (except as it affects interpretive clarity and transparency). Broader “quality of regulation” debates unrelated to clarity or coverage.
RCC evaluates the quality and navigability of the rulebook as a rulebook, not the substantive policy stance or outcomes.
Scoring conventions and evidence rule
RCC uses a 0–3 evidence‑based scale:
0 = Opaque / materially unclear: key requirements are hard to find, ambiguous, contradictory, or not operational. No regulation at all.
1 = Partially clear: some guidance exists but significant ambiguity or gaps remain, creating material uncertainty for common models. Advisory / policy statements etc, providing some level of clarification. Role of supervisory processes.
2 = Clear and workable: most relevant rules are findable and understandable; some gaps or fragmentation remain.
3 = Highly clear, coherent, and comprehensive: rules are well‑organised, well‑defined, publicly accessible, consistently explained, and cover the core fintech perimeter with clear compliance pathways.
Across the RCC matrix, a score of 3 should normally require all of the conditions for a 2, plus evidence that the framework is clearly organised and easy to navigate. In practice, this should usually mean that a firm can see how the relevant pieces fit together through a clear official entry point such as a portal, consolidated handbook, licensing map, rulebook structure, or equivalent public navigational tool.
For any score of 3, the evidence log should normally include at least:
a public navigational or mapping tool (for example, portal, handbook, licensing map, or guidance that helps users find obligations), and at least one public binding instrument (law, regulation, rulebook or equivalent) supporting the underlying obligations.
Every score must be supported by public sources (laws / regulations, regulator handbooks, licensing pages, official FAQs / guidance, consultation documents, official portals, policy statements / judicial decisions etc.). “Reputation” or private information cannot be used as evidence.
Conduct of review
The initial review will typically be undertaken as a desk review process. Ideally, it will be followed by direct engagement with participants, similarly to other international standards review processes.
For purposes of FRFI scoring, the RCC Working Group has adopted the following definition of Fintech:
“Fintech businesses use existing or new technology via centralised or decentralised systems to disrupt, to reimagine, to expand a services offering, to create financial instruments, to inhabit a niche, or to offer new ways for people to participate in their financial lives, either directly or through existing financial services providers, from a business, sales, information, analytics, product, regulatory or risk management standpoint.”
This definition is intentionally broad and inclusive. It encompasses new entrants and legacy players, retail and institutional services, and both the provision of financial services directly to end users and the provision of technology that enables others to provide such services. It covers activities conducted on both centralised systems (traditional software, cloud infrastructure) and decentralised systems (blockchain, distributed ledger technology).
A regulatory framework that does not keep pace with new technologies and fintech business models slows the realisation of these potential benefits, by creating uncertainty and friction around licensing, obligations, and compliance
Implication for Scoring: The Regulatory Status Problem
A critical feature of this definition is that it deliberately spans the full spectrum of regulatory status. Fintech businesses as defined above may be:
Category A, Directly Regulated: The firm itself holds a license or registration and is subject to direct regulatory obligations. Forward looking approach. Category B, Unregulated: The firm’s activities do not trigger a licensing or registration requirement and the firm is not subject to direct regulatory obligations. Category C, Unregulated but Indirectly Regulated: The firm is not itself licensed or registered, but provides services to a regulated entity that enable regulated functions, and as a result is subject to regulatory requirements imposed through the regulated entity’s obligations via outsourcing rules, vendor management requirements, or contractual terms imposed by regulatory compulsion.
This three-way distinction creates the following two scoring challenges.
First, for firms in Category B: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an unregulated FinTech firm that it is unregulated, and do so with sufficient clarity that the firm can rely on that determination? A firm that is simply silent in the regulatory framework faces uncertainty, which is itself a form of regulatory unclarity. A well-functioning regulatory environment provides clear negative perimeter guidance, affirmative statements about what is not regulated, not just positive licensing requirements.
Second, for firms in Category C: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an indirectly regulated FinTech firm what obligations flow to it through its regulated clients, and does it do so in a way that is publicly accessible and operationally usable? This category is growing rapidly as regulators extend supervisory reach to critical third-party technology providers, and the clarity, or lack thereof, of those indirect obligations is a material issue for FinTech firms operating as vendors to the regulated sector.
These are addressed through the indicators in the instructions and considerations .
Why this Distinction Matters for RCC
Regulatory regimes differ fundamentally in how they express obligations, and this difference has direct consequences for how RCC indicators should be scored. The RCC pillar measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech-relevant rules are clear, findable, and complete. But “clear” means something different depending on the regulatory philosophy underlying the framework being assessed. Scorers who fail to account for this distinction will systematically undervalue sophisticated principles-based systems and overvalue prescriptive rules-based systems that may in practice be less navigable.
Rules-Based Regimes
A rules-based regime specifies obligations in precise, detailed terms. It tells regulated firms exactly what they must do, when, how, and in what form. Typical features include numerical thresholds, prescribed reporting formats, mandatory contract terms, defined timelines, enumerated prohibited activities, and specific procedural requirements. The firm’s compliance question is essentially binary: did it follow the specified rule or not?
Rules-based regimes are strong on operational clarity: a firm generally knows exactly what it must file, in what format, and by when. Their limitation is that detailed rules can become outdated quickly as technology and business models evolve, may produce compliance-with-the-letter-but-not-the-spirit behaviour, and can create rigidity that impedes legitimate innovation.
Principles-Based Regimes
A principles-based regime specifies obligations in terms of outcomes or standards of conduct, leaving firms to determine how to achieve them. It tells regulated firms what to achieve, treat customers fairly, maintain adequate capital, manage risk prudently, act with integrity, without dictating the specific means. The firm exercises judgment about how to comply.
Principles-based regimes are strong on outcome clarity: a firm generally knows what standard it is expected to meet and what objective it is expected to achieve. Their limitation is operational ambiguity: a firm may understand perfectly well that it must “treat customers fairly” while remaining genuinely uncertain about whether a specific product feature, disclosure format, or complaint-handling procedure satisfies that obligation. In a principles-based system, that operational content is typically supplied not by the rules themselves but by supplementary interpretive mechanisms, supervisory guidance, published case studies, regulatory speeches, enforcement decisions, and FAQs, which accumulate over time to give the principles practical meaning.
Outcomes-based Regimes
An outcomes-based regime focuses on a particular set of results. The system is then designed to achieve the results which are being targeted.
Such systems - to be effective - must have clear outcomes. Those outcomes must then be clearly tied to the elements of the regulatory system. [add example]
Merit-based Regimes
Merit-based regimes focus on qualitative results: decisions are based on intentions. A merit-based regime may thus be similar in some ways to an outcome based system. However, an outcome based system typically seeks objective results while a merit-based system targets more subjectively. An outcome based system may target “better quality financial products and services” while a merit-based system may target “good financial products and services”.
Merit-based systems often lack clarity of merits being targeted. For clarity, a merits-based regime would need to have clear targets enabled by a regulatory system designed to achieve those targets.
The Spectrum in Practice
Real regulatory systems sit at various points on a spectrum between these categories and most are hybrids. A jurisdiction may use principles for conduct and outcomes while using precise rules for technical requirements such as capital ratios, prescribed reporting taxonomies, and defined timelines for complaint resolution. The UK’s FCA Handbook is a well-known example of a sophisticated hybrid: it contains both high-level principles (the FCA’s Principles for Businesses) and highly detailed prescriptive rules. The EU’s approach under MiCA tends toward greater prescriptiveness. The US operates differently again, with some agencies using a mix of principles and rules while others rely more heavily on supervisory guidance.
How This Affects RCC Scoring
The key analytical point for RCC scoring is this: a principles-based regime can be highly clear on outcomes while being less clear on operations; a rules-based regime tends toward the opposite: clearer on operations but potentially less adaptable and less clear on the underlying purpose of the obligation. To be effective, an outcomes or a merit based regime must have clear outcomes or targets and a system designed to achieve these. No approach is inherently superior from a clarity standpoint, and the FRFI does not take a position on which regulatory philosophy produces better outcomes. What the FRFI measures is how well each jurisdiction achieves clarity within its own chosen approach, and whether the mechanisms it uses to supply operational content are adequate for a regulated firm to determine and implement its obligations.
This has three practical consequences for scoring:
Multiple paths to a high score exist. For indicators where this tension arises, principally RCC-2, RCC-4, RCC-5, RCC-6, and RCC-7, a jurisdiction can reach a score of 3 via a rules-based path, a principles-based path, an outcomes-based path or a merits-based path. The evidence required differs and these paths are specified explicitly in the affected indicators. A principles-based regime should not receive a 3 solely because the underlying principles are well expressed at a high level. A 3 requires that those principles be made operationally usable through a sufficiently mature public interpretive infrastructure, for example through FAQs, speeches, case studies, examples, supervisory statements, enforcement summaries, or equivalent materials that show how the principles are applied in practice. RCC-6 carries greater weight in principles-based systems. In a rules-based system, the rules themselves supply operational content. In a principles-based system, that content is supplied through guidance, FAQs, supervisory statements, and enforcement precedent. For principles-based jurisdictions, RCC-6 is the mechanism by which principles acquire operational clarity. Scorers should read RCC-5 and RCC-6 together for principles-based jurisdictions. Scorers must identify the regulatory philosophy before scoring and note it in the evidence log. This affects both the evidence sought and the rubric path applied. See Section 7 (Evaluator Instructions) for the required procedure.
Sub-dimension: Weight / Indicators A: Accessibility & Usability: 20%: RCC-1, RCC-2 B: Definitions & Perimeter Clarity: 30%: RCC-3, RCC-4, RCC-8, RCC-9 C: Coverage & Completeness: 30%: RCC-4, RCC-5 D: Consistency, Change Management & Interpretive Support: 20%: RCC-6, RCC-7
Working Group decision required on whether to adjust weights following addition of RCC-8 and the elevated importance of RCC-6 in principles-based systems. [Weights are indicative and subject to revision; there is no strict scientific basis for their distribution.]
RCC currently uses eight core indicators. The detailed objective-trigger tables in Section 4 specify how to score 0–3; this overview summarises the purpose of each indicator.
RCC-1 Public accessibility & findability: Whether fintech-relevant rules are freely available online and easy to locate via official sources. RCC-2 Regulatory “map” of obligations: Whether regulators provide an official, usable pathway explaining how a fintech firm, across all three regulatory status categories, determines what license it needs, what licensing conditions apply, what obligations apply, and how to navigate the regulatory framework.. RCC-3 Definitions, Taxonomy & Perimeter Clarity for Common Fintech Activities: Whether key regulatory terms and fintech-relevant activity categories are defined clearly enough that a firm can tell, from public sources, whether it falls within the regulatory perimeter and which regime applies. RCC-4 Coverage across core fintech verticals: Whether the rule corpus covers the major fintech activity verticals without large gaps. RCC-5 Compliance operability: Whether a regulated firm, and where applicable an indirectly regulated vendor, can determine how to implement its obligations in practice RCC-6 Interpretive support & Q&A mechanisms: Whether regulators provide reliable public mechanisms (FAQs, guidance, interpretive processes) to reduce uncertainty. RCC-7 Change management & version control: Whether rule changes, whether to prescriptive rules or to principles and their interpretive elaboration, are made transparently and predictably, with sufficient notice for firms to adapt.. RCC-8: Outsourcing Perimeter & Indirect Supervision Clarity: Whether a regulated FinTech firm, or a regulated entity that uses FinTech vendors, can determine from publicly available sources which of its outsourced or delegated functions remain subject to regulatory oversight, and what it must therefore ensure of the third parties to whom those functions have been delegated.
Market Access & Economic Opportunity assesses whether a jurisdiction's regulatory framework and core financial infrastructure enable broad, affordable access to safe digital financial services, especially for underserved individuals, microenterprises, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), by lowering unnecessary barriers to entry, enabling inclusive onboarding, and supporting practical distribution and payment rails.
Section 0
Overview
It measures enablers (rules, permissions, frameworks, access to rails), not outcomes like account-ownership rates or fintech funding. It does not reward lax regulation. Strong economic opportunity frameworks can score highly when they are risk-based, operational, and enforceable.
Section 1
SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES
22
Market entry frameworks for non-bank payment providers and e-money issuers (as economic opportunity enablers); Rules governing access to payment systems/rails (direct or indirect access); Proportionate AML/CFT approaches that enable low-risk accounts (tiered KYC/simplified CDD); Remote onboarding and acceptable identity methods for economic opportunity (digital ID, non-documentary verification); Agent networks/cash-in, cash-out frameworks that support reaching underserved populations; Policies enabling basic/affordable transaction accounts and low-value digital payments
03
Ecosystem/venture metrics (funding volumes, # of fintechs); Adoption or penetration outcomes (account ownership, transaction volumes) except as optional contextual narrative; Broader telecom/energy infrastructure measures
Section 2
SCORING CONVENTIONS
Applies the index-wide 0 to 3 scale and four scoring paths specific to this pillar.
0
Absent / prohibitive:
no meaningful enabling framework; or rules materially prevent access/entry.
1
Emerging:
partial or pilot approaches; limited coverage; unclear operational pathways.
2
Established:
framework is usable and broadly applicable; some gaps or frictions remain.
3
Comprehensive & implemented:
mature, coherent enabling framework with clear rules, practical pathways, and supervisory guidance/oversight.
Evidence rule
Every score must be supported by publicly verifiable sources (laws/regulations, central bank or regulator rules, official guidance, payment system access criteria, official financial economic opportunity strategies, etc.). Do not score on reputation.
Section 3
Indicator Categories and Weights
Sub-dimension
Weight / Indicators
A — Market Access & Competition for Providers
30% — MAEO-1, MAEO-2, MAEO-3, MAEO-4
B — Inclusive Onboarding & Identity
15% — MAEO-5, MAEO-6
C — Distribution & Cash-In / Cash-Out Enablement
15% — MAEO-7
D — Affordable, Universal Retail Access Policies
15% — MAEO-8
E — Capital Markets Access & Participation
12.50% — MAEO-9
F — Credit Access & Lending
12.50% — MAEO-10
6
Section 4
Indicator Matrix
10
A
B
C
D
E
F
MAEO-1
Provider Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways
Source differs: this edit was written against another version. Current text is above; the original proposal is below. It has not been applied to the current passage.
Provider Removed: Authorisation,Added: Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways
Sub-dim A
00 sug
RCC-1
Public Accessibility & Findability
Sub-dimension
What it measures
Whether nonbank providers have clear, proportionate, navigable routes to market, including direct licensing and bank-non-bank partnership pathways.
Framing Note
Pathways note
Multiple routes to a high score are valid. A jurisdiction can score well through a direct nonbank licensing regime, through a clear bank-partnership (or sponsorship) pathway, or both. Partnership arrangements include but are not limited to agent-of-bank, whitelabeling, and equivalent models. The benchmark scores whether a nonbank pathway exists even where banks dominate in practice. Score access to market, not speed of licensing.
Scoring Rubric
Score
Proposed Objective Trigger
No authorization category for nonbank providers, or de facto prohibition; only banks may provide core services and no partnership pathway exists.
Source differs: this edit was written against another version. Current text is above; the original proposal is below. It has not been applied to the current passage.
No Removed: authorisationAdded: authorization category for non-bank providers, or de facto prohibition; only banks may provide core services and no partnership pathway exists.
Limited or unclear permissions; narrow scope; pilot or case-by-case authorization; partnership routes informal, undocumented, or unavailable to non-banks; or licensing requirements are entity-based with no activity or function-based alternative.
Established licensing/registration regime for nonbank PSP/e-money providers with usable, proportionate requirements—or a clearly documented bank-partnership pathway. Some gaps or frictions remain in tiering criteria or technology neutrality.
Comprehensive, tiered, proportionate regime enabling diverse nonbank providers across digital payment service types; authorisation framework is activity or risk-based or explicitly accommodates digital-native business models on technology-neutral terms; safeguarding requirements proportionate to the risk of the specific financial function; tiering criteria are risk-based rather than scale-based; direct licensing and/or partnership pathways publicly documented with operational guidance and named obligations per category.
Scoring paths
All (single path).
Primary evidence sources
Payments/e-money law; regulator licensing rules and “how to get authorized” pages; tiered or proportionate licensing frameworks; bank-sponsorship/agent-of-bank guidance; official guidance and licensing category descriptions.
Edge cases & scoring notes
• Score access to market, not speed or cost of licensing. • A nonbank pathway counts even if banks dominate in practice—document that the pathway exists and is usable. • Score proportionality and clarity, not strictness. A demanding but clear and risk-based regime can score 3. • A clear prohibition on nonbank provision is a legitimate regulatory position—score the clarity of the perimeter, not the policy choice. • Enacted-but-not-yet-in-force regimes score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is also available. • Where the framework demonstrates activity-based authorisation, technology-neutral licensing, and risk-proportionate safeguarding, note these as positive indicators within score 2 or 3. • A jurisdiction moving from partnership-dependent to direct licensing should not be penalized if the direct licensing regime is proportionate.
Aggregation rule
Direct
single integer score 0-3.
Suggest an edit
Endorse a level
Cite this indicator
MAEO-2
Essential Payment Infrastructure & Access
Evaluates if Essential Payment Infrastructure is available (RTGS, ACH/batch systems, and instant/low-value payment systems) and whether PSPs, financial institutions and other eligible regulated providers can access essential payment rails, settlement/safeguarding accounts, scheme rules, regulated digital money or stablecoin-enabled settlement arrangements, instant/low-value systems, and public-sector payment channels. This indicator should assess whether access is clear, non-discriminatory, interoperable and usable in practice, including where providers rely on indirect access, sponsor banks, regulated settlement networks, or fiat on/off-ramp partners.
Access note
A jurisdiction can score well with indirect access if the rules are transparent and workable. This should include technology-neutral pathways for regulated digital settlement models, including stablecoins or tokenized money used for payments, provided the framework addresses licensing, governance, safeguarding, redemption, settlement, operational resilience and AML/CFT expectations.
Infrastructure of payments rails is basic and does not allow interoperable digital payments.
Basic digital payment infrastructure exists but access is closed or opaque; nonbanks are excluded from rails and cannot obtain settlement/safeguarding accounts or case-by-case access with unclear criteria; no published pathway; interoperability and instant-system access undefined for nonbanks.
Essential payment infrastructure is available and defined direct and/or indirect access pathways exist with published criteria; some constraints remain (e.g., partial interoperability, limited access to instant systems).
Modern essential payment infrastructure is available, including RTGS, batch ACH and instant/low-value payment systems, and where permitted, regulated digital money or stablecoin-enabled settlement arrangements. Access criteria are published and workable for banks, PSPs, and eligible regulated nonbank providers, whether direct or indirect. The framework includes governance, interoperability expectations, settlement or safeguarding account access, operational guidance, and clear rules for local fiat payout, redemption or conversion where relevant.
level
Payment-system regulation/rules; digital assets payments regulation; central-bank access criteria to the RTGS; scheme membership frameworks; instant/fast-payment system participation rules; safeguarding/settlement account rules; interoperability mandates; G2P/public-payment access policies.
• Indirect access (via a sponsor bank) can support a high score if criteria are transparent and workable. • Access criteria available only in nonpublic membership manuals support a score no higher than 2. • Score the framework's openness and clarity, not the number of direct participants or transaction volumes. • A published, clearly-bounded restriction (e.g., direct access reserved for systemic participants with a defined indirect route for others) is a clarity feature, not automatically a penalty.
single integer score 0-3
MAEO-3
Open finance & data access for broadening market access
Whether rules grant third-party providers regulated, standardized access to account and financial data, enabling competition and new entrants on fair terms. Includes whether the regime is mandatory or voluntary (and, if voluntary, whether the regulator sets the API and participation standards), and whether technical standards are workable for nonbank participants rather than de facto limited to banks and other financial institutions. No single model (free access, threshold pricing, premium APIs, cost recovery, market-led) is treated as the benchmark; what's assessed is whether terms are transparent, proportionate, and non-discriminatory. Additionally, we measure whether API access fees, onboarding costs, membership fees/bilateral charges are transparently disclosed/opaque and proportionate. These determine whether nonbanks can actually connect and compete. Beyond the scope of bank accounts and payment initiation, the framework should also consider whether relevant nonbank data sources are covered, such as e-money wallets, mobile money, credit, savings, insurance etc.
No data-access framework; data sharing is prohibited, or occurs only through unregulated bilateral arrangements/screen-scraping with no rules.
Market-driven regimes with no common standards; participation de facto limited to banks or financial institutions; accreditation pathway for nonbanks and new entrants unclear.
Established framework (mandatory, or regulator-backed voluntary) with some standardization; nonbank TPPs can be accredited and participate, but gaps remain in data scope, technical standards, opaque or disproportionate access pricing and commercial terms.
Comprehensive regime with mandatory or regulator-set API and participation standards that are workable, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory access terms under any pricing model, for nonbank participants; clear accreditation/onboarding; broad data scope (e-money wallets, mobile money, credit, savings, insurance); supervisory oversight and dispute mechanisms.
Open-finance regulations; regulator or standards-body API specifications; TPP accreditation, registration, or licensing rules; participation and liability frameworks; data-sharing mandates; soft-law instruments such as guidance; API registries led by the regulators; private-sector led standards.
• Coordinate with IEMI (open-banking maturity), MAEO scores the inclusive-access dimension only. • A voluntary regime with no standards scores no higher than 2, even if some banks participate. • Where the framework is genuinely nascent or voluntary, score accordingly rather than penalizing—but note that de facto bank-only participation caps the score at 1. • Consumer data-consent rules belong to CPMC; do not re-score consent adequacy here. • Open finance regulations can be established by data protection authorities. This should be considered when looking for the primary evidence sources.
Cross-pillar boundary note
IEMI has primary ownership of open banking as an innovation-maturity indicator. MAEO scores the same framework only from the inclusive-access/competition angle—whether nonbank entrants can actually participate. Coordinate with IEMI to avoid double-scoring.
MAEO-4
Cross-border payment access & recognition
Sub-dim C
Whether rules enable regulated providers to offer cross-border or remote payment and financial services through clear licensing, recognition, equivalence, passporting, supervisory cooperation or corridor-based arrangements. This includes whether regulated digital money/stablecoins or tokenized settlement assets can be used as a compliant settlement layer for cross-border payments, remittances, treasury, merchant, SME or institutional payment use cases, with clear rules for local payout, redemption, AML/CFT, Travel Rule compliance and consumer/business access.
No cross-border provision permitted; the market is effectively closed to foreign-licensed providers and no recognition framework exists.
Limited or ad hoc cross-border arrangements; case-by-case approvals; criteria unclear or unpublished.
A published framework exists for some cross-border payment, remittance, recognition, local licensing, corridor or partnership models; gaps remain for eligible providers, payout, redemption, FX, or digital settlement.
Comprehensive, published frameworks enabling licensed or otherwise eligible providers to offer cross-border or remote payment services, including through recognition, equivalence, passporting, corridor arrangements or clear local licensing. The framework supports compliant digital money/stablecoin-enabled settlement where permitted, with supervisory cooperation, AML/CFT and Travel Rule expectations, operational guidance, clear treatment of redemption or local fiat payout, and transparent rules for participation by banks, PSPs, VASPs or other regulated intermediaries.
Cross-border payment and remittance regulations; payment institution, e-money, money transmission, VASP or stablecoin issuer regimes; recognition, equivalence or passporting frameworks; supervisory MoUs; central-bank or regulator guidance on remote provision; stablecoin or digital asset payment token rules; Travel Rule and AML/CFT guidance; fiat payout, redemption, reserve, safeguarding and custody rules.
• For members of a regional block, score the applicable regional regime as well as the national one; document which regime was scored. • A clearly published decision not to permit cross-border provision is a legitimate position—score the clarity of the perimeter. • Do not score capital-account or FX policy as such (out of scope); focus on whether the market-access enabler exists and is navigable. • Where this indicator is weakly applicable to small or highly-integrated jurisdictions, confirm N/A-handling rules with the Lead Team. • Do not score speculative crypto trading, token issuance volume or market adoption. Score only whether the regulatory framework enables compliant cross-border payment access and settlement in practice. • A jurisdiction should not receive a high score merely because digital assets are generally permitted. Higher scores require a usable regulated pathway for payment or settlement use cases, including licensing, AML/CFT, redemption or payout arrangements, and operational guidance. • A clear prohibition on stablecoin-based payment services may help perimeter clarity, but it should not score highly for digital-asset inclusivity unless another regulated digital money or cross-border settlement pathway is available.
MAEO-5
Inclusive Onboarding, KYC & Remote Verification
Sub-dim B
Whether tiered KYC, simplified CDD, remote onboarding, and digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification enable access for underserved individual users.
No tiered or simplified CDD for low-risk accounts; remote onboarding not legally enabled; digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification not recognized for financial onboarding. One or more of these conditions is sufficient to score 0.
Early pilots, tiered or simplified CDD exists in law but is narrow in scope or lacks operational guidance; remote onboarding legally permitted but restricted to limited cases with unclear requirements; digital ID or non-documentary verification referenced but acceptance is conditional or ambiguous.
Tiered or simplified CDD established in law or binding guidance with defined thresholds; remote onboarding enabled across a broad range of low-risk products with defined acceptable methods; digital ID or non-documentary verification accepted for financial onboarding with defined parameters. Gaps may remain in coverage or guidance clarity.
Risk-based tiering with defined thresholds and supervisory guidance across a broad range of account types; remote onboarding enabled across all major product categories with clearly defined acceptable methods in regulation or published supervisory guidance; digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification explicitly recognised in regulation or published supervisory guidance.
AML/CFT legislation and regulation; KYC and eKYC guidance; tiered or simplified CDD frameworks and basic account rules; digital ID and electronic verification frameworks as accepted for financial services; regulator guidance on acceptable identity methods and remote onboarding. Reference: FATF Guidance on Digital Identity and Simplified/Enhanced Due Diligence.
• Score proportionality and clarity, not strictness. • Where digital ID or non-documentary verification exists but is not accepted for financial onboarding, score lower. • A jurisdiction may present asymmetrically—proportionate KYC tiering without digital ID or non-documentary verification acceptance, or vice versa—scorers should note asymmetry explicitly rather than allowing a composite score to obscure a material gap. • Coordinate with RI and IEMI to avoid scoring the same legal text for the same purpose. • Enacted-but-not-in-force tiering rules score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is issued.
RCC scores whether AML/CFT rules are clearly articulated and findable; RI scores the substantive risk-based quality and coverage of the AML/CFT regime; MAEO scores only proportionality and tiered CDD that enable low-risk account access. For digital ID and non-documentary verification, IEMI scores eKYC framework maturity while MAEO scores whether these methods are accepted for inclusion-focused accounts.
MAEO-6
MSME & Sole Trader Onboarding Proportionality
Whether business verification requirements for micro, small, and sole trader businesses are proportionate to risk and do not create barriers to access that larger businesses do not face.
No regulatory provision for simplified or tiered business verification; beneficial ownership and business verification requirements apply uniformly regardless of business size or risk; no explicit accommodation of informal or unregistered businesses.
Simplified or tiered business verification exists in law but is narrow in scope or lacks operational guidance; informal or unregistered businesses not explicitly addressed in regulatory framework.
Simplified or risk-tiered business verification established in law or binding guidance with defined thresholds by business size or risk category; some accommodation of sole traders or informal operators either through distinct provisions or explicit extension of individual frameworks. Gaps may remain in coverage or guidance clarity.
Proportionate, risk-based business verification framework with defined thresholds across business size and entity type in regulation or published supervisory guidance; explicit accommodation of sole traders and informally registered or unregistered businesses whether through distinct provisions or explicit extension of individual frameworks; nonbank providers explicitly permitted to apply simplified business verification for qualifying entities.
Beneficial ownership regulations and guidance by business size or entity type; business account opening rules and regulator guidance on verification for non-individual customers; AML/CFT regulations where simplified CDD extends to micro or small businesses; business registration laws where unregistered or informal businesses are recognised for financial onboarding. Reference: FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership for Legal Persons and Arrangements.
• In markets with high informal economic participation, accommodation of sole traders within individual KYC frameworks is acceptable evidence for score 2 or 3; a formal KYB framework is not required. • Where the framework is silent on MSME verification proportionality, default to the score reflecting the individual framework applied to businesses; typically 0 or 1. • Nonbank providers explicitly permitted to apply simplified business verification score higher than where this permission is absent. • Enacted-but-not-operational frameworks score no higher than 1 until operational guidance is issued. • Coordinate with RI on beneficial ownership quality and MAEO-1 on nonbank provider access. • Evidence sources are distinct from MAEO-5; where a single regulatory instrument addresses both individual and business verification, reference business-specific provisions only.
RCC scores whether business verification rules are clearly articulated; RI scores the substantive quality of beneficial ownership and AML/CFT frameworks; MAEO scores only whether business verification requirements are proportionate to risk for smaller entities and do not create disproportionate barriers to accessing digital financial services.
Whether business verification requirements for micro, small, and sole trader businesses (including those operating informally or without formal registration) are proportionate to risk and do not create barriers to access that larger businesses do not face.
MAEO-7
Provider networks & last-mile distribution
Whether nonbank providers can offer accessible online and retail options for depositing and withdrawing cash and accessing credit, within a clear authorization and oversight framework.
Maturity note
A “mature” distribution framework is defined by explicit scoring triggers—provider accountability, accessibility, and consumer protections—not by the number of providers. Score whether the framework enables diversity of providers across channels and geographies, not how many exist.
No contemplation of nonbank financial services partners that can operate outside of bank retail branches, whether online or through nonbank retail partners.
Allows for the provision of money services via nonbank partners, but without a clear authorization mechanism or regulatory framework.
Establishes a clear framework for nonbank providers to operate within as well as clear oversight, consumer protections, and accountability; some product gaps remain.
Mature framework enabling many nonbank providers and multiple options for access to financial services with clear rules, protections, and accountability parity between core banking functionality and those provided by nonbank providers including cash in/out and credit.
Diversity of options for access to financial services through nonbank partners, in particular the deposit of and access to cash in both online and nonbank retail channels; clear rules on safety and soundness for governing nonbank partners; clarity on consumer protections and recourse.
• Score whether the framework enables nonbank providers to access the registrations, authorizations or other licenses that formalize their authority to provide services and hold them accountable. • Note whether regulatory enforcement around nonbank providers appears ad hoc with enforcement defining rules or whether accountability is grounded in a clear upfront framework. • A score of 3 requires clarity around the nonbank provider's initial ability to offer products as well as ongoing monitoring around consumer protections, reliability, and other protections. • Competition and diversity of offerings by a multitude of players is indicative of a well-functioning regulatory environment that supports distribution across retail and online vs. limitations in offerings and consolidation amongst banking providers.
MAEO-8
Affordability & Low-Value Transaction Cost Barriers
Sub-dim D
Whether basic accounts, low-fee products, affordability rules, and the absence of disproportionate levies support affordable access to financial services.
No basic-account or affordability policy; high friction or disproportionate levies for low-value users.
Policy intent only; limited or pilot affordability measures with no clear or enforceable obligations.
Established and implemented basic-account or affordability framework exists; coverage is uneven across products or providers.
Comprehensive, implemented measures—clear eligibility, fee-structure expectations, and regulatory oversight/monitoring—that support universal access, with no disproportionate levies on low-value transactions.
Basic account legislation or regulations; payment account access laws; central bank or financial regulator rules governing low-cost transaction accounts and payment products; national retail payments strategies; fee cap or pricing regulations; tax and levy laws affecting retail digital payments; supervisory guidance; published monitoring or compliance reports related to affordability requirements.
• Score the regulatory framework for affordability and access, not market outcomes such as product uptake, pricing, or transaction volumes; do not re-score consumer disclosures or conduct (CPMC owns these). • Disproportionate transaction taxes or levies on low-value payments count as an access barrier and should be documented. Jurisdictions should not be penalized for imposing broadly applicable taxes or fees unless they create disproportionate barriers to low-value financial activity. • Distinguish a genuine basic-account obligation from a voluntary industry commitment; voluntary-only measures cap the score at 2. • Temporary subsidy programs, promotional pricing, or time-limited government incentives should not materially increase a score unless supported by an enduring regulatory or statutory framework. • Where affordability protections apply only to traditional bank accounts and not functionally equivalent digital financial products, users should reflect any resulting limitations in coverage.
MAEO scores affordability and access; CPMC owns consumer disclosures and conduct.
MAEO-9
Capital Markets & Investment Participation
Sub-dim E
Whether the framework provides proportionate pathways for (a) issuers, SME capital-raising through crowdfunding, offer-size exemptions, simplified disclosure, or listing-lite regimes; (b) investors, retail participation through platforms and pooled/fractional products, with safeguards rather than exclusion; and (c) intermediaries, authorization of platforms and their access to market infrastructure, including for digital securities.
No proportionate framework on any of the three dimensions (issuers—SME capital-raising via crowdfunding, offer exemptions, listing-lite; investors—retail participation via platforms and pooled/fractional products; intermediaries—platform authorization and their access to market infrastructure, including digital securities); securities law provides no entry route for SME issuers, retail participation, or platform authorization. Score 0 means the framework offers no entry route on any of them.
Emerging or pilot rules on one of the three dimensions only (issuer capital-raising, retail investor participation, or platform authorization); scope is narrow, rules are draft or pilot-stage, and the authorization pathway for platforms is unclear or unpublished.
Established, proportionate regimes on at least two of the three dimensions (e.g., investment-based crowdfunding for issuers and an authorization route for platforms), but material gaps remain on the third or within a covered dimension—such as digital securities, pooled/fractional products, or platform access to market infrastructure.
Comprehensive, proportionate frameworks across all three dimensions—issuer capital-raising (equity and debt crowdfunding, offer-size exemptions, simplified disclosure or listing-lite regimes), retail investor participation (platforms and pooled/fractional products, with safeguards rather than exclusion), and intermediaries (platform authorization and access to trading and settlement infrastructure, including for digital securities)—supported by published authorization guidance and timelines.
Securities laws; crowdfunding/marketplace-investment regulations; retail-investment-platform rules; digital/tokenized-securities frameworks; financial instruments frameworks; SME capital-raising and listing regimes; fund and collective-investment rules relevant to fractional products.
• Score the access framework, not market depth or investment outcomes. • A clearly published prohibition of a specific channel (e.g., one crowdfunding model) is a legitimate policy choice—score the clarity of the perimeter, not the choice itself. Prohibition of one channel does not cap the score where the other dimensions have proportionate frameworks. • Investor-protection safeguards (investment limits, risk warnings, disclosure requirements) are compatible with a score of 3 and are not penalized; proportionate access does not mean unrestricted access. • Where digital or tokenized securities are genuinely nascent, score the framework that exists rather than penalizing the jurisdiction for the market's stage of development. • Debt crowdfunding and P2P lending—coordinate with the digital-lending indicator to avoid double-scoring the same regime. • Coordinate with IEMI on the maturity of digital-securities infrastructure to avoid double-scoring.
Coordinate with IEMI on digital-securities infrastructure maturity.
MAEO-10
Credit Access & Lending Infrastructure
Sub-dim F
Whether nonbank/digital lenders can operate, access credit information systems, and use alternative data with supervisory clarity, with data being refreshed within ample time to suffice credit approval needs and decreased tenors that occur with the advent of digital credit. Hence, we cover whether the market includes real-time or near-real-time credit reporting as digital credit moves quickly. The infrastructure should also be able to capture multiple small loans across providers before borrower exposure becomes invisible. Access to credit information also needs to go two ways: non-bank lenders should be able to access credit data, but also report into the system; therefore the reporting perimeter should go beyond banks. Credit infrastructure should cover MFIs, digital lenders, BNPL, merchant cash advances, platform lenders, and embedded finance providers where relevant. The framework should clarify safeguards for the collection, use, and sharing of alternative data. Guidance should cover acceptable data, automated scoring, explainability, error correction, and recourse.
No pathway for nonbank/digital lenders, or de facto prohibition; no access to credit-information systems; alternative-data use prohibited or wholly unaddressed.
Limited or unclear licensing for non-bank lenders; credit-bureau access restricted to banks; alternative-data use unaddressed in guidance. Credit information is refreshed every 30 days and available infrastructure does not cover multiple borrowings by end clients well, although there are short-term/nano lenders on the market.
Established nonbank/digital-lending regime; some access to credit-information systems; emerging guidance on alternative-data use.
Comprehensive regime: clear licensing/registration for nonbank and digital lenders; fair, rule-based access to credit-information systems and registries; supervisory clarity on alternative-data use and responsible lending, supported by operational guidance. Credit information is refreshed in real time or near to real time.
Nonbank lending/microfinance/moneylending laws; credit-bureau and credit-registry access rules; guidance on alternative data and automated credit scoring; responsible-lending and affordability-assessment rules; open-data/data-portability rules relevant to credit.
• RCC scores clarity of the rules and CPMC scores responsible-lending/conduct adequacy—coordinate to avoid double-scoring; MAEO scores whether the access framework exists and is usable. • Score the access framework, not lending volumes or default outcomes. • Note interactions with data-protection rules where alternative-data use is constrained; document whether constraints are clear and navigable. • Enacted-but-not-in-force lending rules score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is issued.
RCC scores clarity of the rules; CPMC scores responsible-lending and conduct adequacy; MAEO scores whether the access framework exists and is usable.
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02 · Edit
reworked · 1 word out, 1 word in
Provider Removed: Authorisation,Added: Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways
Full recorded document context, including this proposal’s other changes. Surrounding passages use their current wording. Edits against older wording are marked separately.
Preview only. Red strikethrough marks removals; green underlining marks additions. Unchanged passages remain in place.
Whether getting in is a defined process with published requirements, timelines, and appeal rights, or a negotiation whose terms depend on who is asking.
This is the largest pillar because it covers everything between a firm deciding to enter a market and that firm operating in it. Requirements, evidence, fees, decision timelines, licence tiers, refusal reasons, appeals, recognition of foreign authorisation, and access to supervisory testing arrangements.
The failure it detects is not strictness. A jurisdiction is entitled to set a high bar. The failure is opacity: requirements that exist but are not written, timelines quoted informally, and outcomes that vary between applicants who look the same on paper. Where that happens, incumbents and well advised entrants are advantaged over everyone else, and the regulator loses the ability to defend its own decisions.
Economic opportunity is the reason the pillar is scored this way. Every undocumented requirement is a cost paid by the applicants least able to absorb it.
Covers the full requirement set an applicant must meet, determination periods and published performance against them, licence tiers with measurable thresholds, written reasons for refusal and an independent appeal route. Excludes how high the bar is set, company formation outside the financial regime, and commercial viability.
Market Access & Economic Opportunity assesses everything between a firm deciding to enter a market and that firm operating in it: requirements, evidence, fees, decision timelines, licence tiers, refusal reasons, appeals, recognition of foreign authorisation, and access to supervisory testing arrangements.
The failure this pillar detects is not strictness. A jurisdiction is entitled to set a high bar. The failure is opacity, because every undocumented requirement is a cost paid by the applicants least able to absorb it.
The complete requirement set an applicant must meet, and the evidence standard for each
Determination periods, clock rules, and published performance against them
Licence tiers defined by measurable thresholds, and the transition between them
Written reasons for refusal, and an appeal route independent of the decision line
Terms on which supervisory testing arrangements are granted
Recognition and equivalence arrangements, and the notice given before withdrawal
The height of the bar, which is a policy choice for the jurisdiction
Company formation and tax registration outside the financial regime
Commercial viability of any particular business model
Authorisation requirements published in full
Decision timelines and reported performance
Proportionate licence tiers
Refusal reasons and appeal rights
Recognition of foreign authorisation
Weights are a starting point. The working group may revise them with documented rationale, which means they are open to an edit too.
Where a regulator publishes a determination period but not its performance, the assessment reads the commitment and notes the absence rather than estimating the reality.
Requirements communicated only in pre-application meetings are invisible to a documentary assessment, which is precisely the failure this pillar is trying to surface.
Nine indicators. This is the canonical text. Select any passage to propose an alternative.
Pillar definition
Rules Clarity & Comprehensiveness (RCC) measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech‑relevant rules are:
Findable and understandable (“clarity”), and complete enough to cover common fintech activities and risks (“comprehensiveness”), in a way that a regulated firm, or prospective entrant, can determine what licence it needs, what obligations apply, and how to comply, using publicly available materials.
This is not a “friendliness” or deregulatory score. It does not reward laxity; it rewards clarity, coherence, and coverage of the fintech rulebook itself.
Scope and boundaries
In scope (fintech‑relevant rule corpus):
Primary laws and regulations covering:
Core: Payments / payment systems / e-money Banking / lending / credit Securities / investment / advice / management Insurance Digital assets: custody, issuance of crypto tokens / asset tokenisation / stablecoins, crypto‑asset services (if applicable) Subareas within core: Regtech / suptech Digital banking / fintech licensing / regulation digital lending / BNPL Roboadvisory / automated trading Financial infrastructure / trading systems Data analytics / AI Internal IT systems Crowdfunding (if applicable)
Cross‑cutting supervisory requirements that materially affect fintech operations, including:
Core: AML/CFT / (e)kyc Data protection Data use / portability / consent in financial services Identity Subareas: Outsourcing / cloud Cybersecurity Operational resilience Safeguarding of funds Market conduct requirements
Out of scope:
Ecosystem outcomes (e.g. investment levels, number of fintechs). Enforcement “toughness” (except as it affects interpretive clarity and transparency). Broader “quality of regulation” debates unrelated to clarity or coverage.
RCC evaluates the quality and navigability of the rulebook as a rulebook, not the substantive policy stance or outcomes.
Scoring conventions and evidence rule
RCC uses a 0–3 evidence‑based scale:
0 = Opaque / materially unclear: key requirements are hard to find, ambiguous, contradictory, or not operational. No regulation at all.
1 = Partially clear: some guidance exists but significant ambiguity or gaps remain, creating material uncertainty for common models. Advisory / policy statements etc, providing some level of clarification. Role of supervisory processes.
2 = Clear and workable: most relevant rules are findable and understandable; some gaps or fragmentation remain.
3 = Highly clear, coherent, and comprehensive: rules are well‑organised, well‑defined, publicly accessible, consistently explained, and cover the core fintech perimeter with clear compliance pathways.
Across the RCC matrix, a score of 3 should normally require all of the conditions for a 2, plus evidence that the framework is clearly organised and easy to navigate. In practice, this should usually mean that a firm can see how the relevant pieces fit together through a clear official entry point such as a portal, consolidated handbook, licensing map, rulebook structure, or equivalent public navigational tool.
For any score of 3, the evidence log should normally include at least:
a public navigational or mapping tool (for example, portal, handbook, licensing map, or guidance that helps users find obligations), and at least one public binding instrument (law, regulation, rulebook or equivalent) supporting the underlying obligations.
Every score must be supported by public sources (laws / regulations, regulator handbooks, licensing pages, official FAQs / guidance, consultation documents, official portals, policy statements / judicial decisions etc.). “Reputation” or private information cannot be used as evidence.
Conduct of review
The initial review will typically be undertaken as a desk review process. Ideally, it will be followed by direct engagement with participants, similarly to other international standards review processes.
For purposes of FRFI scoring, the RCC Working Group has adopted the following definition of Fintech:
“Fintech businesses use existing or new technology via centralised or decentralised systems to disrupt, to reimagine, to expand a services offering, to create financial instruments, to inhabit a niche, or to offer new ways for people to participate in their financial lives, either directly or through existing financial services providers, from a business, sales, information, analytics, product, regulatory or risk management standpoint.”
This definition is intentionally broad and inclusive. It encompasses new entrants and legacy players, retail and institutional services, and both the provision of financial services directly to end users and the provision of technology that enables others to provide such services. It covers activities conducted on both centralised systems (traditional software, cloud infrastructure) and decentralised systems (blockchain, distributed ledger technology).
A regulatory framework that does not keep pace with new technologies and fintech business models slows the realisation of these potential benefits, by creating uncertainty and friction around licensing, obligations, and compliance
Implication for Scoring: The Regulatory Status Problem
A critical feature of this definition is that it deliberately spans the full spectrum of regulatory status. Fintech businesses as defined above may be:
Category A, Directly Regulated: The firm itself holds a license or registration and is subject to direct regulatory obligations. Forward looking approach. Category B, Unregulated: The firm’s activities do not trigger a licensing or registration requirement and the firm is not subject to direct regulatory obligations. Category C, Unregulated but Indirectly Regulated: The firm is not itself licensed or registered, but provides services to a regulated entity that enable regulated functions, and as a result is subject to regulatory requirements imposed through the regulated entity’s obligations via outsourcing rules, vendor management requirements, or contractual terms imposed by regulatory compulsion.
This three-way distinction creates the following two scoring challenges.
First, for firms in Category B: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an unregulated FinTech firm that it is unregulated, and do so with sufficient clarity that the firm can rely on that determination? A firm that is simply silent in the regulatory framework faces uncertainty, which is itself a form of regulatory unclarity. A well-functioning regulatory environment provides clear negative perimeter guidance, affirmative statements about what is not regulated, not just positive licensing requirements.
Second, for firms in Category C: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an indirectly regulated FinTech firm what obligations flow to it through its regulated clients, and does it do so in a way that is publicly accessible and operationally usable? This category is growing rapidly as regulators extend supervisory reach to critical third-party technology providers, and the clarity, or lack thereof, of those indirect obligations is a material issue for FinTech firms operating as vendors to the regulated sector.
These are addressed through the indicators in the instructions and considerations .
Why this Distinction Matters for RCC
Regulatory regimes differ fundamentally in how they express obligations, and this difference has direct consequences for how RCC indicators should be scored. The RCC pillar measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech-relevant rules are clear, findable, and complete. But “clear” means something different depending on the regulatory philosophy underlying the framework being assessed. Scorers who fail to account for this distinction will systematically undervalue sophisticated principles-based systems and overvalue prescriptive rules-based systems that may in practice be less navigable.
Rules-Based Regimes
A rules-based regime specifies obligations in precise, detailed terms. It tells regulated firms exactly what they must do, when, how, and in what form. Typical features include numerical thresholds, prescribed reporting formats, mandatory contract terms, defined timelines, enumerated prohibited activities, and specific procedural requirements. The firm’s compliance question is essentially binary: did it follow the specified rule or not?
Rules-based regimes are strong on operational clarity: a firm generally knows exactly what it must file, in what format, and by when. Their limitation is that detailed rules can become outdated quickly as technology and business models evolve, may produce compliance-with-the-letter-but-not-the-spirit behaviour, and can create rigidity that impedes legitimate innovation.
Principles-Based Regimes
A principles-based regime specifies obligations in terms of outcomes or standards of conduct, leaving firms to determine how to achieve them. It tells regulated firms what to achieve, treat customers fairly, maintain adequate capital, manage risk prudently, act with integrity, without dictating the specific means. The firm exercises judgment about how to comply.
Principles-based regimes are strong on outcome clarity: a firm generally knows what standard it is expected to meet and what objective it is expected to achieve. Their limitation is operational ambiguity: a firm may understand perfectly well that it must “treat customers fairly” while remaining genuinely uncertain about whether a specific product feature, disclosure format, or complaint-handling procedure satisfies that obligation. In a principles-based system, that operational content is typically supplied not by the rules themselves but by supplementary interpretive mechanisms, supervisory guidance, published case studies, regulatory speeches, enforcement decisions, and FAQs, which accumulate over time to give the principles practical meaning.
Outcomes-based Regimes
An outcomes-based regime focuses on a particular set of results. The system is then designed to achieve the results which are being targeted.
Such systems - to be effective - must have clear outcomes. Those outcomes must then be clearly tied to the elements of the regulatory system. [add example]
Merit-based Regimes
Merit-based regimes focus on qualitative results: decisions are based on intentions. A merit-based regime may thus be similar in some ways to an outcome based system. However, an outcome based system typically seeks objective results while a merit-based system targets more subjectively. An outcome based system may target “better quality financial products and services” while a merit-based system may target “good financial products and services”.
Merit-based systems often lack clarity of merits being targeted. For clarity, a merits-based regime would need to have clear targets enabled by a regulatory system designed to achieve those targets.
The Spectrum in Practice
Real regulatory systems sit at various points on a spectrum between these categories and most are hybrids. A jurisdiction may use principles for conduct and outcomes while using precise rules for technical requirements such as capital ratios, prescribed reporting taxonomies, and defined timelines for complaint resolution. The UK’s FCA Handbook is a well-known example of a sophisticated hybrid: it contains both high-level principles (the FCA’s Principles for Businesses) and highly detailed prescriptive rules. The EU’s approach under MiCA tends toward greater prescriptiveness. The US operates differently again, with some agencies using a mix of principles and rules while others rely more heavily on supervisory guidance.
How This Affects RCC Scoring
The key analytical point for RCC scoring is this: a principles-based regime can be highly clear on outcomes while being less clear on operations; a rules-based regime tends toward the opposite: clearer on operations but potentially less adaptable and less clear on the underlying purpose of the obligation. To be effective, an outcomes or a merit based regime must have clear outcomes or targets and a system designed to achieve these. No approach is inherently superior from a clarity standpoint, and the FRFI does not take a position on which regulatory philosophy produces better outcomes. What the FRFI measures is how well each jurisdiction achieves clarity within its own chosen approach, and whether the mechanisms it uses to supply operational content are adequate for a regulated firm to determine and implement its obligations.
This has three practical consequences for scoring:
Multiple paths to a high score exist. For indicators where this tension arises, principally RCC-2, RCC-4, RCC-5, RCC-6, and RCC-7, a jurisdiction can reach a score of 3 via a rules-based path, a principles-based path, an outcomes-based path or a merits-based path. The evidence required differs and these paths are specified explicitly in the affected indicators. A principles-based regime should not receive a 3 solely because the underlying principles are well expressed at a high level. A 3 requires that those principles be made operationally usable through a sufficiently mature public interpretive infrastructure, for example through FAQs, speeches, case studies, examples, supervisory statements, enforcement summaries, or equivalent materials that show how the principles are applied in practice. RCC-6 carries greater weight in principles-based systems. In a rules-based system, the rules themselves supply operational content. In a principles-based system, that content is supplied through guidance, FAQs, supervisory statements, and enforcement precedent. For principles-based jurisdictions, RCC-6 is the mechanism by which principles acquire operational clarity. Scorers should read RCC-5 and RCC-6 together for principles-based jurisdictions. Scorers must identify the regulatory philosophy before scoring and note it in the evidence log. This affects both the evidence sought and the rubric path applied. See Section 7 (Evaluator Instructions) for the required procedure.
Sub-dimension: Weight / Indicators A: Accessibility & Usability: 20%: RCC-1, RCC-2 B: Definitions & Perimeter Clarity: 30%: RCC-3, RCC-4, RCC-8, RCC-9 C: Coverage & Completeness: 30%: RCC-4, RCC-5 D: Consistency, Change Management & Interpretive Support: 20%: RCC-6, RCC-7
Working Group decision required on whether to adjust weights following addition of RCC-8 and the elevated importance of RCC-6 in principles-based systems. [Weights are indicative and subject to revision; there is no strict scientific basis for their distribution.]
RCC currently uses eight core indicators. The detailed objective-trigger tables in Section 4 specify how to score 0–3; this overview summarises the purpose of each indicator.
RCC-1 Public accessibility & findability: Whether fintech-relevant rules are freely available online and easy to locate via official sources. RCC-2 Regulatory “map” of obligations: Whether regulators provide an official, usable pathway explaining how a fintech firm, across all three regulatory status categories, determines what license it needs, what licensing conditions apply, what obligations apply, and how to navigate the regulatory framework.. RCC-3 Definitions, Taxonomy & Perimeter Clarity for Common Fintech Activities: Whether key regulatory terms and fintech-relevant activity categories are defined clearly enough that a firm can tell, from public sources, whether it falls within the regulatory perimeter and which regime applies. RCC-4 Coverage across core fintech verticals: Whether the rule corpus covers the major fintech activity verticals without large gaps. RCC-5 Compliance operability: Whether a regulated firm, and where applicable an indirectly regulated vendor, can determine how to implement its obligations in practice RCC-6 Interpretive support & Q&A mechanisms: Whether regulators provide reliable public mechanisms (FAQs, guidance, interpretive processes) to reduce uncertainty. RCC-7 Change management & version control: Whether rule changes, whether to prescriptive rules or to principles and their interpretive elaboration, are made transparently and predictably, with sufficient notice for firms to adapt.. RCC-8: Outsourcing Perimeter & Indirect Supervision Clarity: Whether a regulated FinTech firm, or a regulated entity that uses FinTech vendors, can determine from publicly available sources which of its outsourced or delegated functions remain subject to regulatory oversight, and what it must therefore ensure of the third parties to whom those functions have been delegated.
Market Access & Economic Opportunity assesses whether a jurisdiction's regulatory framework and core financial infrastructure enable broad, affordable access to safe digital financial services, especially for underserved individuals, microenterprises, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), by lowering unnecessary barriers to entry, enabling inclusive onboarding, and supporting practical distribution and payment rails.
Section 0
Overview
It measures enablers (rules, permissions, frameworks, access to rails), not outcomes like account-ownership rates or fintech funding. It does not reward lax regulation. Strong economic opportunity frameworks can score highly when they are risk-based, operational, and enforceable.
Section 1
SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES
22
Market entry frameworks for non-bank payment providers and e-money issuers (as economic opportunity enablers); Rules governing access to payment systems/rails (direct or indirect access); Proportionate AML/CFT approaches that enable low-risk accounts (tiered KYC/simplified CDD); Remote onboarding and acceptable identity methods for economic opportunity (digital ID, non-documentary verification); Agent networks/cash-in, cash-out frameworks that support reaching underserved populations; Policies enabling basic/affordable transaction accounts and low-value digital payments
03
Ecosystem/venture metrics (funding volumes, # of fintechs); Adoption or penetration outcomes (account ownership, transaction volumes) except as optional contextual narrative; Broader telecom/energy infrastructure measures
Section 2
SCORING CONVENTIONS
Applies the index-wide 0 to 3 scale and four scoring paths specific to this pillar.
0
Absent / prohibitive:
no meaningful enabling framework; or rules materially prevent access/entry.
1
Emerging:
partial or pilot approaches; limited coverage; unclear operational pathways.
2
Established:
framework is usable and broadly applicable; some gaps or frictions remain.
3
Comprehensive & implemented:
mature, coherent enabling framework with clear rules, practical pathways, and supervisory guidance/oversight.
Evidence rule
Every score must be supported by publicly verifiable sources (laws/regulations, central bank or regulator rules, official guidance, payment system access criteria, official financial economic opportunity strategies, etc.). Do not score on reputation.
Section 3
Indicator Categories and Weights
Sub-dimension
Weight / Indicators
A — Market Access & Competition for Providers
30% — MAEO-1, MAEO-2, MAEO-3, MAEO-4
B — Inclusive Onboarding & Identity
15% — MAEO-5, MAEO-6
C — Distribution & Cash-In / Cash-Out Enablement
15% — MAEO-7
D — Affordable, Universal Retail Access Policies
15% — MAEO-8
E — Capital Markets Access & Participation
12.50% — MAEO-9
F — Credit Access & Lending
12.50% — MAEO-10
6
Section 4
Indicator Matrix
10
A
B
C
D
E
F
MAEO-1
Provider Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways
Source differs: this edit was written against another version. Current text is above; the original proposal is below. It has not been applied to the current passage.
Provider Removed: Authorisation,Added: Authorization, Proportionality & Partnership Pathways
Sub-dim A
00 sug
RCC-1
Public Accessibility & Findability
Sub-dimension
What it measures
Whether nonbank providers have clear, proportionate, navigable routes to market, including direct licensing and bank-non-bank partnership pathways.
Framing Note
Pathways note
Multiple routes to a high score are valid. A jurisdiction can score well through a direct nonbank licensing regime, through a clear bank-partnership (or sponsorship) pathway, or both. Partnership arrangements include but are not limited to agent-of-bank, whitelabeling, and equivalent models. The benchmark scores whether a nonbank pathway exists even where banks dominate in practice. Score access to market, not speed of licensing.
Scoring Rubric
Score
Proposed Objective Trigger
No authorization category for nonbank providers, or de facto prohibition; only banks may provide core services and no partnership pathway exists.
Source differs: this edit was written against another version. Current text is above; the original proposal is below. It has not been applied to the current passage.
No Removed: authorisationAdded: authorization category for non-bank providers, or de facto prohibition; only banks may provide core services and no partnership pathway exists.
Limited or unclear permissions; narrow scope; pilot or case-by-case authorization; partnership routes informal, undocumented, or unavailable to non-banks; or licensing requirements are entity-based with no activity or function-based alternative.
Established licensing/registration regime for nonbank PSP/e-money providers with usable, proportionate requirements—or a clearly documented bank-partnership pathway. Some gaps or frictions remain in tiering criteria or technology neutrality.
Comprehensive, tiered, proportionate regime enabling diverse nonbank providers across digital payment service types; authorisation framework is activity or risk-based or explicitly accommodates digital-native business models on technology-neutral terms; safeguarding requirements proportionate to the risk of the specific financial function; tiering criteria are risk-based rather than scale-based; direct licensing and/or partnership pathways publicly documented with operational guidance and named obligations per category.
Scoring paths
All (single path).
Primary evidence sources
Payments/e-money law; regulator licensing rules and “how to get authorized” pages; tiered or proportionate licensing frameworks; bank-sponsorship/agent-of-bank guidance; official guidance and licensing category descriptions.
Edge cases & scoring notes
• Score access to market, not speed or cost of licensing. • A nonbank pathway counts even if banks dominate in practice—document that the pathway exists and is usable. • Score proportionality and clarity, not strictness. A demanding but clear and risk-based regime can score 3. • A clear prohibition on nonbank provision is a legitimate regulatory position—score the clarity of the perimeter, not the policy choice. • Enacted-but-not-yet-in-force regimes score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is also available. • Where the framework demonstrates activity-based authorisation, technology-neutral licensing, and risk-proportionate safeguarding, note these as positive indicators within score 2 or 3. • A jurisdiction moving from partnership-dependent to direct licensing should not be penalized if the direct licensing regime is proportionate.
Aggregation rule
Direct
single integer score 0-3.
Suggest an edit
Endorse a level
Cite this indicator
MAEO-2
Essential Payment Infrastructure & Access
Evaluates if Essential Payment Infrastructure is available (RTGS, ACH/batch systems, and instant/low-value payment systems) and whether PSPs, financial institutions and other eligible regulated providers can access essential payment rails, settlement/safeguarding accounts, scheme rules, regulated digital money or stablecoin-enabled settlement arrangements, instant/low-value systems, and public-sector payment channels. This indicator should assess whether access is clear, non-discriminatory, interoperable and usable in practice, including where providers rely on indirect access, sponsor banks, regulated settlement networks, or fiat on/off-ramp partners.
Access note
A jurisdiction can score well with indirect access if the rules are transparent and workable. This should include technology-neutral pathways for regulated digital settlement models, including stablecoins or tokenized money used for payments, provided the framework addresses licensing, governance, safeguarding, redemption, settlement, operational resilience and AML/CFT expectations.
Infrastructure of payments rails is basic and does not allow interoperable digital payments.
Basic digital payment infrastructure exists but access is closed or opaque; nonbanks are excluded from rails and cannot obtain settlement/safeguarding accounts or case-by-case access with unclear criteria; no published pathway; interoperability and instant-system access undefined for nonbanks.
Essential payment infrastructure is available and defined direct and/or indirect access pathways exist with published criteria; some constraints remain (e.g., partial interoperability, limited access to instant systems).
Modern essential payment infrastructure is available, including RTGS, batch ACH and instant/low-value payment systems, and where permitted, regulated digital money or stablecoin-enabled settlement arrangements. Access criteria are published and workable for banks, PSPs, and eligible regulated nonbank providers, whether direct or indirect. The framework includes governance, interoperability expectations, settlement or safeguarding account access, operational guidance, and clear rules for local fiat payout, redemption or conversion where relevant.
level
Payment-system regulation/rules; digital assets payments regulation; central-bank access criteria to the RTGS; scheme membership frameworks; instant/fast-payment system participation rules; safeguarding/settlement account rules; interoperability mandates; G2P/public-payment access policies.
• Indirect access (via a sponsor bank) can support a high score if criteria are transparent and workable. • Access criteria available only in nonpublic membership manuals support a score no higher than 2. • Score the framework's openness and clarity, not the number of direct participants or transaction volumes. • A published, clearly-bounded restriction (e.g., direct access reserved for systemic participants with a defined indirect route for others) is a clarity feature, not automatically a penalty.
single integer score 0-3
MAEO-3
Open finance & data access for broadening market access
Whether rules grant third-party providers regulated, standardized access to account and financial data, enabling competition and new entrants on fair terms. Includes whether the regime is mandatory or voluntary (and, if voluntary, whether the regulator sets the API and participation standards), and whether technical standards are workable for nonbank participants rather than de facto limited to banks and other financial institutions. No single model (free access, threshold pricing, premium APIs, cost recovery, market-led) is treated as the benchmark; what's assessed is whether terms are transparent, proportionate, and non-discriminatory. Additionally, we measure whether API access fees, onboarding costs, membership fees/bilateral charges are transparently disclosed/opaque and proportionate. These determine whether nonbanks can actually connect and compete. Beyond the scope of bank accounts and payment initiation, the framework should also consider whether relevant nonbank data sources are covered, such as e-money wallets, mobile money, credit, savings, insurance etc.
No data-access framework; data sharing is prohibited, or occurs only through unregulated bilateral arrangements/screen-scraping with no rules.
Market-driven regimes with no common standards; participation de facto limited to banks or financial institutions; accreditation pathway for nonbanks and new entrants unclear.
Established framework (mandatory, or regulator-backed voluntary) with some standardization; nonbank TPPs can be accredited and participate, but gaps remain in data scope, technical standards, opaque or disproportionate access pricing and commercial terms.
Comprehensive regime with mandatory or regulator-set API and participation standards that are workable, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory access terms under any pricing model, for nonbank participants; clear accreditation/onboarding; broad data scope (e-money wallets, mobile money, credit, savings, insurance); supervisory oversight and dispute mechanisms.
Open-finance regulations; regulator or standards-body API specifications; TPP accreditation, registration, or licensing rules; participation and liability frameworks; data-sharing mandates; soft-law instruments such as guidance; API registries led by the regulators; private-sector led standards.
• Coordinate with IEMI (open-banking maturity), MAEO scores the inclusive-access dimension only. • A voluntary regime with no standards scores no higher than 2, even if some banks participate. • Where the framework is genuinely nascent or voluntary, score accordingly rather than penalizing—but note that de facto bank-only participation caps the score at 1. • Consumer data-consent rules belong to CPMC; do not re-score consent adequacy here. • Open finance regulations can be established by data protection authorities. This should be considered when looking for the primary evidence sources.
Cross-pillar boundary note
IEMI has primary ownership of open banking as an innovation-maturity indicator. MAEO scores the same framework only from the inclusive-access/competition angle—whether nonbank entrants can actually participate. Coordinate with IEMI to avoid double-scoring.
MAEO-4
Cross-border payment access & recognition
Sub-dim C
Whether rules enable regulated providers to offer cross-border or remote payment and financial services through clear licensing, recognition, equivalence, passporting, supervisory cooperation or corridor-based arrangements. This includes whether regulated digital money/stablecoins or tokenized settlement assets can be used as a compliant settlement layer for cross-border payments, remittances, treasury, merchant, SME or institutional payment use cases, with clear rules for local payout, redemption, AML/CFT, Travel Rule compliance and consumer/business access.
No cross-border provision permitted; the market is effectively closed to foreign-licensed providers and no recognition framework exists.
Limited or ad hoc cross-border arrangements; case-by-case approvals; criteria unclear or unpublished.
A published framework exists for some cross-border payment, remittance, recognition, local licensing, corridor or partnership models; gaps remain for eligible providers, payout, redemption, FX, or digital settlement.
Comprehensive, published frameworks enabling licensed or otherwise eligible providers to offer cross-border or remote payment services, including through recognition, equivalence, passporting, corridor arrangements or clear local licensing. The framework supports compliant digital money/stablecoin-enabled settlement where permitted, with supervisory cooperation, AML/CFT and Travel Rule expectations, operational guidance, clear treatment of redemption or local fiat payout, and transparent rules for participation by banks, PSPs, VASPs or other regulated intermediaries.
Cross-border payment and remittance regulations; payment institution, e-money, money transmission, VASP or stablecoin issuer regimes; recognition, equivalence or passporting frameworks; supervisory MoUs; central-bank or regulator guidance on remote provision; stablecoin or digital asset payment token rules; Travel Rule and AML/CFT guidance; fiat payout, redemption, reserve, safeguarding and custody rules.
• For members of a regional block, score the applicable regional regime as well as the national one; document which regime was scored. • A clearly published decision not to permit cross-border provision is a legitimate position—score the clarity of the perimeter. • Do not score capital-account or FX policy as such (out of scope); focus on whether the market-access enabler exists and is navigable. • Where this indicator is weakly applicable to small or highly-integrated jurisdictions, confirm N/A-handling rules with the Lead Team. • Do not score speculative crypto trading, token issuance volume or market adoption. Score only whether the regulatory framework enables compliant cross-border payment access and settlement in practice. • A jurisdiction should not receive a high score merely because digital assets are generally permitted. Higher scores require a usable regulated pathway for payment or settlement use cases, including licensing, AML/CFT, redemption or payout arrangements, and operational guidance. • A clear prohibition on stablecoin-based payment services may help perimeter clarity, but it should not score highly for digital-asset inclusivity unless another regulated digital money or cross-border settlement pathway is available.
MAEO-5
Inclusive Onboarding, KYC & Remote Verification
Sub-dim B
Whether tiered KYC, simplified CDD, remote onboarding, and digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification enable access for underserved individual users.
No tiered or simplified CDD for low-risk accounts; remote onboarding not legally enabled; digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification not recognized for financial onboarding. One or more of these conditions is sufficient to score 0.
Early pilots, tiered or simplified CDD exists in law but is narrow in scope or lacks operational guidance; remote onboarding legally permitted but restricted to limited cases with unclear requirements; digital ID or non-documentary verification referenced but acceptance is conditional or ambiguous.
Tiered or simplified CDD established in law or binding guidance with defined thresholds; remote onboarding enabled across a broad range of low-risk products with defined acceptable methods; digital ID or non-documentary verification accepted for financial onboarding with defined parameters. Gaps may remain in coverage or guidance clarity.
Risk-based tiering with defined thresholds and supervisory guidance across a broad range of account types; remote onboarding enabled across all major product categories with clearly defined acceptable methods in regulation or published supervisory guidance; digital ID or legally recognized non-documentary verification explicitly recognised in regulation or published supervisory guidance.
AML/CFT legislation and regulation; KYC and eKYC guidance; tiered or simplified CDD frameworks and basic account rules; digital ID and electronic verification frameworks as accepted for financial services; regulator guidance on acceptable identity methods and remote onboarding. Reference: FATF Guidance on Digital Identity and Simplified/Enhanced Due Diligence.
• Score proportionality and clarity, not strictness. • Where digital ID or non-documentary verification exists but is not accepted for financial onboarding, score lower. • A jurisdiction may present asymmetrically—proportionate KYC tiering without digital ID or non-documentary verification acceptance, or vice versa—scorers should note asymmetry explicitly rather than allowing a composite score to obscure a material gap. • Coordinate with RI and IEMI to avoid scoring the same legal text for the same purpose. • Enacted-but-not-in-force tiering rules score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is issued.
RCC scores whether AML/CFT rules are clearly articulated and findable; RI scores the substantive risk-based quality and coverage of the AML/CFT regime; MAEO scores only proportionality and tiered CDD that enable low-risk account access. For digital ID and non-documentary verification, IEMI scores eKYC framework maturity while MAEO scores whether these methods are accepted for inclusion-focused accounts.
MAEO-6
MSME & Sole Trader Onboarding Proportionality
Whether business verification requirements for micro, small, and sole trader businesses are proportionate to risk and do not create barriers to access that larger businesses do not face.
No regulatory provision for simplified or tiered business verification; beneficial ownership and business verification requirements apply uniformly regardless of business size or risk; no explicit accommodation of informal or unregistered businesses.
Simplified or tiered business verification exists in law but is narrow in scope or lacks operational guidance; informal or unregistered businesses not explicitly addressed in regulatory framework.
Simplified or risk-tiered business verification established in law or binding guidance with defined thresholds by business size or risk category; some accommodation of sole traders or informal operators either through distinct provisions or explicit extension of individual frameworks. Gaps may remain in coverage or guidance clarity.
Proportionate, risk-based business verification framework with defined thresholds across business size and entity type in regulation or published supervisory guidance; explicit accommodation of sole traders and informally registered or unregistered businesses whether through distinct provisions or explicit extension of individual frameworks; nonbank providers explicitly permitted to apply simplified business verification for qualifying entities.
Beneficial ownership regulations and guidance by business size or entity type; business account opening rules and regulator guidance on verification for non-individual customers; AML/CFT regulations where simplified CDD extends to micro or small businesses; business registration laws where unregistered or informal businesses are recognised for financial onboarding. Reference: FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership for Legal Persons and Arrangements.
• In markets with high informal economic participation, accommodation of sole traders within individual KYC frameworks is acceptable evidence for score 2 or 3; a formal KYB framework is not required. • Where the framework is silent on MSME verification proportionality, default to the score reflecting the individual framework applied to businesses; typically 0 or 1. • Nonbank providers explicitly permitted to apply simplified business verification score higher than where this permission is absent. • Enacted-but-not-operational frameworks score no higher than 1 until operational guidance is issued. • Coordinate with RI on beneficial ownership quality and MAEO-1 on nonbank provider access. • Evidence sources are distinct from MAEO-5; where a single regulatory instrument addresses both individual and business verification, reference business-specific provisions only.
RCC scores whether business verification rules are clearly articulated; RI scores the substantive quality of beneficial ownership and AML/CFT frameworks; MAEO scores only whether business verification requirements are proportionate to risk for smaller entities and do not create disproportionate barriers to accessing digital financial services.
Whether business verification requirements for micro, small, and sole trader businesses (including those operating informally or without formal registration) are proportionate to risk and do not create barriers to access that larger businesses do not face.
MAEO-7
Provider networks & last-mile distribution
Whether nonbank providers can offer accessible online and retail options for depositing and withdrawing cash and accessing credit, within a clear authorization and oversight framework.
Maturity note
A “mature” distribution framework is defined by explicit scoring triggers—provider accountability, accessibility, and consumer protections—not by the number of providers. Score whether the framework enables diversity of providers across channels and geographies, not how many exist.
No contemplation of nonbank financial services partners that can operate outside of bank retail branches, whether online or through nonbank retail partners.
Allows for the provision of money services via nonbank partners, but without a clear authorization mechanism or regulatory framework.
Establishes a clear framework for nonbank providers to operate within as well as clear oversight, consumer protections, and accountability; some product gaps remain.
Mature framework enabling many nonbank providers and multiple options for access to financial services with clear rules, protections, and accountability parity between core banking functionality and those provided by nonbank providers including cash in/out and credit.
Diversity of options for access to financial services through nonbank partners, in particular the deposit of and access to cash in both online and nonbank retail channels; clear rules on safety and soundness for governing nonbank partners; clarity on consumer protections and recourse.
• Score whether the framework enables nonbank providers to access the registrations, authorizations or other licenses that formalize their authority to provide services and hold them accountable. • Note whether regulatory enforcement around nonbank providers appears ad hoc with enforcement defining rules or whether accountability is grounded in a clear upfront framework. • A score of 3 requires clarity around the nonbank provider's initial ability to offer products as well as ongoing monitoring around consumer protections, reliability, and other protections. • Competition and diversity of offerings by a multitude of players is indicative of a well-functioning regulatory environment that supports distribution across retail and online vs. limitations in offerings and consolidation amongst banking providers.
MAEO-8
Affordability & Low-Value Transaction Cost Barriers
Sub-dim D
Whether basic accounts, low-fee products, affordability rules, and the absence of disproportionate levies support affordable access to financial services.
No basic-account or affordability policy; high friction or disproportionate levies for low-value users.
Policy intent only; limited or pilot affordability measures with no clear or enforceable obligations.
Established and implemented basic-account or affordability framework exists; coverage is uneven across products or providers.
Comprehensive, implemented measures—clear eligibility, fee-structure expectations, and regulatory oversight/monitoring—that support universal access, with no disproportionate levies on low-value transactions.
Basic account legislation or regulations; payment account access laws; central bank or financial regulator rules governing low-cost transaction accounts and payment products; national retail payments strategies; fee cap or pricing regulations; tax and levy laws affecting retail digital payments; supervisory guidance; published monitoring or compliance reports related to affordability requirements.
• Score the regulatory framework for affordability and access, not market outcomes such as product uptake, pricing, or transaction volumes; do not re-score consumer disclosures or conduct (CPMC owns these). • Disproportionate transaction taxes or levies on low-value payments count as an access barrier and should be documented. Jurisdictions should not be penalized for imposing broadly applicable taxes or fees unless they create disproportionate barriers to low-value financial activity. • Distinguish a genuine basic-account obligation from a voluntary industry commitment; voluntary-only measures cap the score at 2. • Temporary subsidy programs, promotional pricing, or time-limited government incentives should not materially increase a score unless supported by an enduring regulatory or statutory framework. • Where affordability protections apply only to traditional bank accounts and not functionally equivalent digital financial products, users should reflect any resulting limitations in coverage.
MAEO scores affordability and access; CPMC owns consumer disclosures and conduct.
MAEO-9
Capital Markets & Investment Participation
Sub-dim E
Whether the framework provides proportionate pathways for (a) issuers, SME capital-raising through crowdfunding, offer-size exemptions, simplified disclosure, or listing-lite regimes; (b) investors, retail participation through platforms and pooled/fractional products, with safeguards rather than exclusion; and (c) intermediaries, authorization of platforms and their access to market infrastructure, including for digital securities.
No proportionate framework on any of the three dimensions (issuers—SME capital-raising via crowdfunding, offer exemptions, listing-lite; investors—retail participation via platforms and pooled/fractional products; intermediaries—platform authorization and their access to market infrastructure, including digital securities); securities law provides no entry route for SME issuers, retail participation, or platform authorization. Score 0 means the framework offers no entry route on any of them.
Emerging or pilot rules on one of the three dimensions only (issuer capital-raising, retail investor participation, or platform authorization); scope is narrow, rules are draft or pilot-stage, and the authorization pathway for platforms is unclear or unpublished.
Established, proportionate regimes on at least two of the three dimensions (e.g., investment-based crowdfunding for issuers and an authorization route for platforms), but material gaps remain on the third or within a covered dimension—such as digital securities, pooled/fractional products, or platform access to market infrastructure.
Comprehensive, proportionate frameworks across all three dimensions—issuer capital-raising (equity and debt crowdfunding, offer-size exemptions, simplified disclosure or listing-lite regimes), retail investor participation (platforms and pooled/fractional products, with safeguards rather than exclusion), and intermediaries (platform authorization and access to trading and settlement infrastructure, including for digital securities)—supported by published authorization guidance and timelines.
Securities laws; crowdfunding/marketplace-investment regulations; retail-investment-platform rules; digital/tokenized-securities frameworks; financial instruments frameworks; SME capital-raising and listing regimes; fund and collective-investment rules relevant to fractional products.
• Score the access framework, not market depth or investment outcomes. • A clearly published prohibition of a specific channel (e.g., one crowdfunding model) is a legitimate policy choice—score the clarity of the perimeter, not the choice itself. Prohibition of one channel does not cap the score where the other dimensions have proportionate frameworks. • Investor-protection safeguards (investment limits, risk warnings, disclosure requirements) are compatible with a score of 3 and are not penalized; proportionate access does not mean unrestricted access. • Where digital or tokenized securities are genuinely nascent, score the framework that exists rather than penalizing the jurisdiction for the market's stage of development. • Debt crowdfunding and P2P lending—coordinate with the digital-lending indicator to avoid double-scoring the same regime. • Coordinate with IEMI on the maturity of digital-securities infrastructure to avoid double-scoring.
Coordinate with IEMI on digital-securities infrastructure maturity.
MAEO-10
Credit Access & Lending Infrastructure
Sub-dim F
Whether nonbank/digital lenders can operate, access credit information systems, and use alternative data with supervisory clarity, with data being refreshed within ample time to suffice credit approval needs and decreased tenors that occur with the advent of digital credit. Hence, we cover whether the market includes real-time or near-real-time credit reporting as digital credit moves quickly. The infrastructure should also be able to capture multiple small loans across providers before borrower exposure becomes invisible. Access to credit information also needs to go two ways: non-bank lenders should be able to access credit data, but also report into the system; therefore the reporting perimeter should go beyond banks. Credit infrastructure should cover MFIs, digital lenders, BNPL, merchant cash advances, platform lenders, and embedded finance providers where relevant. The framework should clarify safeguards for the collection, use, and sharing of alternative data. Guidance should cover acceptable data, automated scoring, explainability, error correction, and recourse.
No pathway for nonbank/digital lenders, or de facto prohibition; no access to credit-information systems; alternative-data use prohibited or wholly unaddressed.
Limited or unclear licensing for non-bank lenders; credit-bureau access restricted to banks; alternative-data use unaddressed in guidance. Credit information is refreshed every 30 days and available infrastructure does not cover multiple borrowings by end clients well, although there are short-term/nano lenders on the market.
Established nonbank/digital-lending regime; some access to credit-information systems; emerging guidance on alternative-data use.
Comprehensive regime: clear licensing/registration for nonbank and digital lenders; fair, rule-based access to credit-information systems and registries; supervisory clarity on alternative-data use and responsible lending, supported by operational guidance. Credit information is refreshed in real time or near to real time.
Nonbank lending/microfinance/moneylending laws; credit-bureau and credit-registry access rules; guidance on alternative data and automated credit scoring; responsible-lending and affordability-assessment rules; open-data/data-portability rules relevant to credit.
• RCC scores clarity of the rules and CPMC scores responsible-lending/conduct adequacy—coordinate to avoid double-scoring; MAEO scores whether the access framework exists and is usable. • Score the access framework, not lending volumes or default outcomes. • Note interactions with data-protection rules where alternative-data use is constrained; document whether constraints are clear and navigable. • Enacted-but-not-in-force lending rules score no higher than 2 until operational guidance is issued.
RCC scores clarity of the rules; CPMC scores responsible-lending and conduct adequacy; MAEO scores whether the access framework exists and is usable.