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AI summary · What this changes
Proposal to delete the detailed definition of Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI), retaining only the pillar name.
This edit proposes removing the entire substantive definition of the Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI) pillar. The before text includes the full definition explaining that IEMI assesses whether regulators perform functions to enable responsible fintech innovation, including accessible engagement channels, proportionate authorization pathways, open finance/data-sharing infrastructure, and modern digital onboarding/eKYC frameworks. It also describes the "function over form" principle and scoring approach that rewards coherence, accessibility, and operational implementation, with legislative foundation plus operational guidance scoring higher than guidance alone. The after text replaces all of this with only the pillar name "Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI)", removing the entire explanatory scope, assessment criteria, and scoring rationale.
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Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI)Removed: assesses whether a jurisdiction's regulators perform the functions needed to enable responsible fintech innovation — accessible and connected engagement channels, proportionate authorization pathways, open finance/data-sharing infrastructure, and modern digital onboarding/ eKYC frameworks — regardless of the specific organizational structure or label used to deliver them. The pillar follows a "function over form" principle: it rewards the coherence, accessibility, and operational implementation of these enabling functions, and treats legislative foundation combined with operational regulatory guidance as scoring higher than guidance alone.
Full recorded document context, including this proposal’s other changes. Surrounding passages use their current wording. Edits against older wording are marked separately.
Preview only. Red strikethrough marks removals; green underlining marks additions. Unchanged passages remain in place.
Whether the shared plumbing is open on published terms: data interfaces that are specified and testable, payment system access beyond banks, and testing arrangements with a defined way out.
Innovation policy is mostly infrastructure policy. A jurisdiction that announces an innovation agenda but leaves payment access and data interfaces to bilateral negotiation has advantaged the largest participants and called it enablement.
This pillar is the smallest by count and the most technical. It looks for published specifications rather than published intentions: a data model and an interface a firm can conform to without the counterparty's cooperation, access criteria for payment systems that a non-bank can read and meet, and exit paths from testing arrangements that were written before anyone needed them.
Who authors a specification is not assessed. Regulator, industry body, or standards organisation all qualify, provided the result is public, versioned, and referenced by the obligation.
Covers published and versioned technical specifications with conformance testing, dedicated access interfaces with stated availability, payment system access for non-bank participants, and exit paths from sandboxes. Excludes whether a jurisdiction runs an innovation office, funding and tax treatment, and technology choice.
Innovation & Enablement assesses the shared plumbing: whether data interfaces are specified and testable, whether payment system access extends beyond banks, and whether testing arrangements have a defined way out.
Innovation policy is mostly infrastructure policy. A jurisdiction that announces an innovation agenda but leaves payment access and data interfaces to bilateral negotiation has advantaged the largest participants and called it enablement.
Published, versioned technical specifications for data sharing, and conformance testing
Dedicated access interfaces with stated availability and performance requirements
Direct payment system access criteria applicable to non-bank participants
Exit and wind-down paths from sandboxes and restricted authorisations
Who governs a specification and how it changes
Whether a jurisdiction runs an innovation office or accelerator
Funding, grants and tax treatment of fintech firms
Technology choice, provided the specification is public and testable
Data portability specification and conformance
Dedicated third party access interfaces
Payment system access for non-banks
Testing arrangement exit paths
Standards governance and change process
Weights are a starting point. The working group may revise them with documented rationale, which means they are open to an edit too.
A published specification scores here even where adoption is thin. Interface availability in practice is captured separately and only where the regulator publishes it.
Where a jurisdiction has no open finance regime, the portability sub-dimension is reweighted rather than scored as a failure.
Four indicators. This is the canonical text. Select any passage to propose an alternative.
Pillar definition
Rules Clarity & Comprehensiveness (RCC) measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech‑relevant rules are:
Findable and understandable (“clarity”), and complete enough to cover common fintech activities and risks (“comprehensiveness”), in a way that a regulated firm, or prospective entrant, can determine what licence it needs, what obligations apply, and how to comply, using publicly available materials.
This is not a “friendliness” or deregulatory score. It does not reward laxity; it rewards clarity, coherence, and coverage of the fintech rulebook itself.
Scope and boundaries
In scope (fintech‑relevant rule corpus):
Primary laws and regulations covering:
Core: Payments / payment systems / e-money Banking / lending / credit Securities / investment / advice / management Insurance Digital assets: custody, issuance of crypto tokens / asset tokenisation / stablecoins, crypto‑asset services (if applicable) Subareas within core: Regtech / suptech Digital banking / fintech licensing / regulation digital lending / BNPL Roboadvisory / automated trading Financial infrastructure / trading systems Data analytics / AI Internal IT systems Crowdfunding (if applicable)
Cross‑cutting supervisory requirements that materially affect fintech operations, including:
Core: AML/CFT / (e)kyc Data protection Data use / portability / consent in financial services Identity Subareas: Outsourcing / cloud Cybersecurity Operational resilience Safeguarding of funds Market conduct requirements
Out of scope:
Ecosystem outcomes (e.g. investment levels, number of fintechs). Enforcement “toughness” (except as it affects interpretive clarity and transparency). Broader “quality of regulation” debates unrelated to clarity or coverage.
RCC evaluates the quality and navigability of the rulebook as a rulebook, not the substantive policy stance or outcomes.
Scoring conventions and evidence rule
RCC uses a 0–3 evidence‑based scale:
0 = Opaque / materially unclear: key requirements are hard to find, ambiguous, contradictory, or not operational. No regulation at all.
1 = Partially clear: some guidance exists but significant ambiguity or gaps remain, creating material uncertainty for common models. Advisory / policy statements etc, providing some level of clarification. Role of supervisory processes.
2 = Clear and workable: most relevant rules are findable and understandable; some gaps or fragmentation remain.
3 = Highly clear, coherent, and comprehensive: rules are well‑organised, well‑defined, publicly accessible, consistently explained, and cover the core fintech perimeter with clear compliance pathways.
Across the RCC matrix, a score of 3 should normally require all of the conditions for a 2, plus evidence that the framework is clearly organised and easy to navigate. In practice, this should usually mean that a firm can see how the relevant pieces fit together through a clear official entry point such as a portal, consolidated handbook, licensing map, rulebook structure, or equivalent public navigational tool.
For any score of 3, the evidence log should normally include at least:
a public navigational or mapping tool (for example, portal, handbook, licensing map, or guidance that helps users find obligations), and at least one public binding instrument (law, regulation, rulebook or equivalent) supporting the underlying obligations.
Every score must be supported by public sources (laws / regulations, regulator handbooks, licensing pages, official FAQs / guidance, consultation documents, official portals, policy statements / judicial decisions etc.). “Reputation” or private information cannot be used as evidence.
Conduct of review
The initial review will typically be undertaken as a desk review process. Ideally, it will be followed by direct engagement with participants, similarly to other international standards review processes.
For purposes of FRFI scoring, the RCC Working Group has adopted the following definition of Fintech:
“Fintech businesses use existing or new technology via centralised or decentralised systems to disrupt, to reimagine, to expand a services offering, to create financial instruments, to inhabit a niche, or to offer new ways for people to participate in their financial lives, either directly or through existing financial services providers, from a business, sales, information, analytics, product, regulatory or risk management standpoint.”
This definition is intentionally broad and inclusive. It encompasses new entrants and legacy players, retail and institutional services, and both the provision of financial services directly to end users and the provision of technology that enables others to provide such services. It covers activities conducted on both centralised systems (traditional software, cloud infrastructure) and decentralised systems (blockchain, distributed ledger technology).
A regulatory framework that does not keep pace with new technologies and fintech business models slows the realisation of these potential benefits, by creating uncertainty and friction around licensing, obligations, and compliance
Implication for Scoring: The Regulatory Status Problem
A critical feature of this definition is that it deliberately spans the full spectrum of regulatory status. Fintech businesses as defined above may be:
Category A, Directly Regulated: The firm itself holds a license or registration and is subject to direct regulatory obligations. Forward looking approach. Category B, Unregulated: The firm’s activities do not trigger a licensing or registration requirement and the firm is not subject to direct regulatory obligations. Category C, Unregulated but Indirectly Regulated: The firm is not itself licensed or registered, but provides services to a regulated entity that enable regulated functions, and as a result is subject to regulatory requirements imposed through the regulated entity’s obligations via outsourcing rules, vendor management requirements, or contractual terms imposed by regulatory compulsion.
This three-way distinction creates the following two scoring challenges.
First, for firms in Category B: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an unregulated FinTech firm that it is unregulated, and do so with sufficient clarity that the firm can rely on that determination? A firm that is simply silent in the regulatory framework faces uncertainty, which is itself a form of regulatory unclarity. A well-functioning regulatory environment provides clear negative perimeter guidance, affirmative statements about what is not regulated, not just positive licensing requirements.
Second, for firms in Category C: how does the regulatory framework communicate to an indirectly regulated FinTech firm what obligations flow to it through its regulated clients, and does it do so in a way that is publicly accessible and operationally usable? This category is growing rapidly as regulators extend supervisory reach to critical third-party technology providers, and the clarity, or lack thereof, of those indirect obligations is a material issue for FinTech firms operating as vendors to the regulated sector.
These are addressed through the indicators in the instructions and considerations .
Why this Distinction Matters for RCC
Regulatory regimes differ fundamentally in how they express obligations, and this difference has direct consequences for how RCC indicators should be scored. The RCC pillar measures whether a jurisdiction’s fintech-relevant rules are clear, findable, and complete. But “clear” means something different depending on the regulatory philosophy underlying the framework being assessed. Scorers who fail to account for this distinction will systematically undervalue sophisticated principles-based systems and overvalue prescriptive rules-based systems that may in practice be less navigable.
Rules-Based Regimes
A rules-based regime specifies obligations in precise, detailed terms. It tells regulated firms exactly what they must do, when, how, and in what form. Typical features include numerical thresholds, prescribed reporting formats, mandatory contract terms, defined timelines, enumerated prohibited activities, and specific procedural requirements. The firm’s compliance question is essentially binary: did it follow the specified rule or not?
Rules-based regimes are strong on operational clarity: a firm generally knows exactly what it must file, in what format, and by when. Their limitation is that detailed rules can become outdated quickly as technology and business models evolve, may produce compliance-with-the-letter-but-not-the-spirit behaviour, and can create rigidity that impedes legitimate innovation.
Principles-Based Regimes
A principles-based regime specifies obligations in terms of outcomes or standards of conduct, leaving firms to determine how to achieve them. It tells regulated firms what to achieve, treat customers fairly, maintain adequate capital, manage risk prudently, act with integrity, without dictating the specific means. The firm exercises judgment about how to comply.
Principles-based regimes are strong on outcome clarity: a firm generally knows what standard it is expected to meet and what objective it is expected to achieve. Their limitation is operational ambiguity: a firm may understand perfectly well that it must “treat customers fairly” while remaining genuinely uncertain about whether a specific product feature, disclosure format, or complaint-handling procedure satisfies that obligation. In a principles-based system, that operational content is typically supplied not by the rules themselves but by supplementary interpretive mechanisms, supervisory guidance, published case studies, regulatory speeches, enforcement decisions, and FAQs, which accumulate over time to give the principles practical meaning.
Outcomes-based Regimes
An outcomes-based regime focuses on a particular set of results. The system is then designed to achieve the results which are being targeted.
Such systems - to be effective - must have clear outcomes. Those outcomes must then be clearly tied to the elements of the regulatory system. [add example]
Merit-based Regimes
Merit-based regimes focus on qualitative results: decisions are based on intentions. A merit-based regime may thus be similar in some ways to an outcome based system. However, an outcome based system typically seeks objective results while a merit-based system targets more subjectively. An outcome based system may target “better quality financial products and services” while a merit-based system may target “good financial products and services”.
Merit-based systems often lack clarity of merits being targeted. For clarity, a merits-based regime would need to have clear targets enabled by a regulatory system designed to achieve those targets.
The Spectrum in Practice
Real regulatory systems sit at various points on a spectrum between these categories and most are hybrids. A jurisdiction may use principles for conduct and outcomes while using precise rules for technical requirements such as capital ratios, prescribed reporting taxonomies, and defined timelines for complaint resolution. The UK’s FCA Handbook is a well-known example of a sophisticated hybrid: it contains both high-level principles (the FCA’s Principles for Businesses) and highly detailed prescriptive rules. The EU’s approach under MiCA tends toward greater prescriptiveness. The US operates differently again, with some agencies using a mix of principles and rules while others rely more heavily on supervisory guidance.
How This Affects RCC Scoring
The key analytical point for RCC scoring is this: a principles-based regime can be highly clear on outcomes while being less clear on operations; a rules-based regime tends toward the opposite: clearer on operations but potentially less adaptable and less clear on the underlying purpose of the obligation. To be effective, an outcomes or a merit based regime must have clear outcomes or targets and a system designed to achieve these. No approach is inherently superior from a clarity standpoint, and the FRFI does not take a position on which regulatory philosophy produces better outcomes. What the FRFI measures is how well each jurisdiction achieves clarity within its own chosen approach, and whether the mechanisms it uses to supply operational content are adequate for a regulated firm to determine and implement its obligations.
This has three practical consequences for scoring:
Multiple paths to a high score exist. For indicators where this tension arises, principally RCC-2, RCC-4, RCC-5, RCC-6, and RCC-7, a jurisdiction can reach a score of 3 via a rules-based path, a principles-based path, an outcomes-based path or a merits-based path. The evidence required differs and these paths are specified explicitly in the affected indicators. A principles-based regime should not receive a 3 solely because the underlying principles are well expressed at a high level. A 3 requires that those principles be made operationally usable through a sufficiently mature public interpretive infrastructure, for example through FAQs, speeches, case studies, examples, supervisory statements, enforcement summaries, or equivalent materials that show how the principles are applied in practice. RCC-6 carries greater weight in principles-based systems. In a rules-based system, the rules themselves supply operational content. In a principles-based system, that content is supplied through guidance, FAQs, supervisory statements, and enforcement precedent. For principles-based jurisdictions, RCC-6 is the mechanism by which principles acquire operational clarity. Scorers should read RCC-5 and RCC-6 together for principles-based jurisdictions. Scorers must identify the regulatory philosophy before scoring and note it in the evidence log. This affects both the evidence sought and the rubric path applied. See Section 7 (Evaluator Instructions) for the required procedure.
Sub-dimension: Weight / Indicators A: Accessibility & Usability: 20%: RCC-1, RCC-2 B: Definitions & Perimeter Clarity: 30%: RCC-3, RCC-4, RCC-8, RCC-9 C: Coverage & Completeness: 30%: RCC-4, RCC-5 D: Consistency, Change Management & Interpretive Support: 20%: RCC-6, RCC-7
Working Group decision required on whether to adjust weights following addition of RCC-8 and the elevated importance of RCC-6 in principles-based systems. [Weights are indicative and subject to revision; there is no strict scientific basis for their distribution.]
RCC currently uses eight core indicators. The detailed objective-trigger tables in Section 4 specify how to score 0–3; this overview summarises the purpose of each indicator.
RCC-1 Public accessibility & findability: Whether fintech-relevant rules are freely available online and easy to locate via official sources. RCC-2 Regulatory “map” of obligations: Whether regulators provide an official, usable pathway explaining how a fintech firm, across all three regulatory status categories, determines what license it needs, what licensing conditions apply, what obligations apply, and how to navigate the regulatory framework.. RCC-3 Definitions, Taxonomy & Perimeter Clarity for Common Fintech Activities: Whether key regulatory terms and fintech-relevant activity categories are defined clearly enough that a firm can tell, from public sources, whether it falls within the regulatory perimeter and which regime applies. RCC-4 Coverage across core fintech verticals: Whether the rule corpus covers the major fintech activity verticals without large gaps. RCC-5 Compliance operability: Whether a regulated firm, and where applicable an indirectly regulated vendor, can determine how to implement its obligations in practice RCC-6 Interpretive support & Q&A mechanisms: Whether regulators provide reliable public mechanisms (FAQs, guidance, interpretive processes) to reduce uncertainty. RCC-7 Change management & version control: Whether rule changes, whether to prescriptive rules or to principles and their interpretive elaboration, are made transparently and predictably, with sufficient notice for firms to adapt.. RCC-8: Outsourcing Perimeter & Indirect Supervision Clarity: Whether a regulated FinTech firm, or a regulated entity that uses FinTech vendors, can determine from publicly available sources which of its outsourced or delegated functions remain subject to regulatory oversight, and what it must therefore ensure of the third parties to whom those functions have been delegated.
Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI)Removed: assesses whether a jurisdiction's regulators perform the functions needed to enable responsible fintech innovation — accessible and connected engagement channels, proportionate authorization pathways, open finance/data-sharing infrastructure, and modern digital onboarding/ eKYC frameworks — regardless of the specific organizational structure or label used to deliver them. The pillar follows a "function over form" principle: it rewards the coherence, accessibility, and operational implementation of these enabling functions, and treats legislative foundation combined with operational regulatory guidance as scoring higher than guidance alone.
Section 0
Overview
Innovation Enablement & Market Infrastructure (IEMI) assesses whether a jurisdiction's regulators perform the functions needed to enable responsible fintech innovation accessible and connected engagement channels, proportionate authorization pathways, open finance/data-sharing infrastructure, and modern digital onboarding/eKYC frameworks—regardless of the specific organizational structure or label used to deliver them. The pillar follows a "function over form" principle: it rewards the coherence, accessibility, and operational implementation of these enabling functions, and treats legislative foundation combined with operational regulatory guidance as scoring higher than guidance alone.
It measures whether regulatory-engagement, authorization, data-sharing, and digital-identity functions that enable innovation are being performed and are operationally accessible to firms—not market outcomes such as venture funding raised, number of fintechs launched, or adoption rates. It does not reward lax regulation or the mere existence of a named mechanism (e.g., a "sandbox" or "innovation hub"); a jurisdiction with both a legislative foundation and clear operational guidance generally scores higher than one relying on guidance alone, and the framework evaluates the regulatory function being performed rather than the structural label attached to it.
Section 1
SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES
22
- Regulatory engagement channels for fintechs—accessibility and connectivity of communication channels, formal innovator request mechanisms, multi-agency coordination, and whether regulators convert recurring queries into published guidance/FAQs/rulemakings (IEMI-1), including regulatory technology (RegTech) and supervisory technology (SupTech) as embedded features of that engagement environment rather than a separate infrastructure category - Authorization and testing pathways for novel business models—regulatory flexibility, testing mechanisms (sandboxes, no-action letters, graduated licensing, omnibus powers, letters of forbearance, live testing), graduating pathways out of testing, proportionality of entry requirements, and inter-regulatory coordination for models spanning multiple regulatory domains (IEMI-2) - Open finance and data infrastructure—legislative foundation for data sharing, scope of financial services covered, technical standards and governance, incentive/access-pricing mechanisms, and interoperability across providers (IEMI-3) - Digital onboarding and eKYC enablement—legislative and regulatory basis for remote/digital identity verification, risk-based tiered verification, and interoperability/reliance of digital identity across providers and regulatory domains (IEMI-4)
03
- Venture funding, unicorn counts, incubators, and accelerators (ecosystem metrics) - Fintech adoption rates and usage statistics (outcomes) - General telecom/internet access, unless explicitly required for the functioning of financial rails - Data-portability mechanics beyond data sharing (e.g. account-switching mechanics, prepayment fees) — a distinct concept from open finance and not scored under IEMI-3 - Core payment-rail infrastructure and payment-system interoperability as a standalone market-infrastructure topic — not covered by the four consolidated Year-1 indicators following the 18 June working session; flagged as a candidate cross-pillar boundary item for Section 7
Section 2
SCORING CONVENTIONS
Applies the index-wide 0 to 3 scale and four scoring paths specific to this pillar.
0
Absent / prohibitive
no meaningful regulatory-engagement channel, authorization pathway, data-sharing framework, or onboarding/eKYC provision exists in law, regulation, or published guidance—or it exists only nominally, with no evidence of operational use by firms.
1
Emerging:
the function exists only as a pilot, a proposal, or guidance without legislative backing; enacted-but-not-yet-in-force rules with no operational guidance issued; or coverage is limited to a narrow set of firms/activities with an unclear pathway to broader use.
2
Established:
the function is operating with regular use by firms and either a legislative foundation or clear operational regulatory guidance is in place (not necessarily both); some gaps, frictions, or inconsistencies remain (e.g., unclear graduation pathway, partial agency coordination, narrower-than-full coverage).
3
Comprehensive & implemented:
Both a legislative foundation and operational regulatory guidance are in place; the function is widely accessible, evaluated on substance rather than structural label ("function over form"), routinely used, and demonstrably integrated into supervisory practice and market infrastructure.
Evidence rule
Every score must be supported by public sources (laws, regulations, supervisory handbooks, circulars, guidance notes, official reporting rules). Do not score merely on reputation or anecdotal examples.
Threshold and evidence conventions
Two-variable threshold
Each score combines (i) whether a legislative or regulatory basis exists for the function being measured (engagement channel, authorization pathway, data-sharing mandate, or onboarding/eKYC basis) and (ii) whether that basis is operationalized in practice (published guidance, accessible pathways, demonstrated use by firms). A score of 2 anchors certainty on one of these two variables for the core mechanism described in the indicator; a score of 3 requires certainty on both—legislative foundation and operational guidance—across the full scope of the indicator. Apply this threshold definition consistently across all four indicators.
"Implemented" standard
Distinguish proposals/consultations, enacted-but-not-yet-in-force rules, and fully operational regimes. Proposals or consultations do not score as implemented and cap the attainable score at 1; enacted rules without accompanying operational guidance cap the attainable score at 2.
External standards
An external standard or framework (e.g., ISO 20022, FATF guidance) supports a higher score only where the domestic financial regulator explicitly mandates, endorses, or formally incorporates it—voluntary industry adoption or awareness alone does not.
Objective triggers
Replace vague language ("strong engagement", "well-developed sandbox") with specific, documentable triggers—e.g., "published multi-agency coordination protocol + formal innovator request mechanism + FAQs updated within the past two years", or "primary legislation enabling data sharing + published technical standards + designated dispute-resolution mechanism". Do not penalize non-English jurisdictions for language alone; note whether an official or machine translation was used.
Section 3
Indicator Categories and Weights
Sub-dimension
Weight / Indicators
A — Regulatory Engagement and Innovation Enablement
25% — IEMI-1
B — Path to Authorization
25% — IEMI-2
C — Open Finance and Data Infrastructure
25% — IEMI-3
D — Digital Onboarding and eKYC Enablement
25% — IEMI-4
4
Section 4
Indicator Matrix
04
A
B
C
D
IEMI-1
Regulatory Engagement and Innovation Enablement
Sub-dim a
00 sug
RCC-1
Public Accessibility & Findability
Sub-dim A
Sub-dimension
What it measures
IEMI-1 retains its focus on whether effective, accessible, and connected channels exist for fintechs to engage with regulators, regardless of organizational structure. The existence of a formal innovation hub alone is insufficient.
IEMI-1A
Regulatory Accessibility: whether engagement channels are explicitly open to new, pre-licensed, and early-stage entrants, including but not limited to pre-filing and pre-application meetings, not only to establish regulated firms, as well as whether regulators proactively engage with industry.
IEMI-1B
Regulatory Connectivity: whether the engagement function has direct authority and structural connectivity to operational regulatory divisions (licensing, enforcement, supervision), rather than operating as a siloed communications or government relations function.
IEMI-1C
Formal Determination Request Mechanism: whether firms have a documented right to ask a specific regulatory question and receive a public or binding response (e.g., a no-action letter, formal interpretation, or classification ruling) distinct from general engagement channels and pre-filing meetings.
IEMI-1D
Feedback Loop and Knowledge Publication: whether the regulator systematically converts recurring engagement into public goods/deliverables (e.g., searchable guidance, FAQs, thematic reviews) rather than keeping all outputs confidential and case-specific.
Scoring Rubric
Score
Proposed Objective Trigger
Main rubric
No clear requirements. No regulatory provisions require disclosure of product features, terms and conditions, fees charged or pricing of digital financial products. Channel Test - No requirements reference digital channels or electronic delivery of disclosures.
Evidence rating
No evidence found in Levels 1 - 4.
Applicability rating
No regulated Fintech Provider is subject to the requirement.
Outcome-based rating
No consumer protection outcome. Consumers are not guaranteed to receive information about digital products or fees. No Binding regulatory obligation exists.
Partial rules; limited to some products or offline contexts. Limited disclosure requirements exist but are limited in scope, applying to only certain products, providers, or non-digital channels, or requiring only general information without standardised fee disclosures. Channel Test - Regulations do not require disclosures to be presented through the same digital channel used to market, purchase or manage the product. (permit electronic disclosures).
Evidence only found in Level 4, or limited provisions in Levels 1-3 that apply only to specific products, providers or channels.
Requirement applies only to a limited provider category or only to traditional financial institutions, excluding most fintech providers.
Limited Consumer protection outcome Some consumers receive disclosures, but coverage is fragmented (eg, certain products, providers or channels only). Consumers cannot reasonably expect consistent disclosure across digital financial services.
Broad disclosure rules apply to most relevant products; some digital gaps. Regulation requires disclosure of key product features and material fees for most digital financial products before the consumers enter into an agreement. However, requirements are incomplete, with limited provisions on standardised presentation, ongoing fee updates, digital delivery or comparison costs. Channel Test - Electronic disclosures are required for some digital channels, but requirements are not consistently applied across all digital interfaces or providers. (require digital disclosure where products are offered digitally).
Binding Requirements found in Level 1-3, but they are incomplete in scope, coverage, timing or digital application.
Requirement applies to several major fintech providers categories but excludes one or more significant categories without a clear risk based justification.
Functional Consumer Protection Outcome Most consumers receive standardised disclosures before purchasing or using digital financial products. Material fees and product features are disclosed, but gaps remain in coverage, digital presentation, ongoing updates, or supervisory monitoring.
Strong, digital-appropriate disclosure standards (incl. clear pricing, standardized formats, key facts) + guidance. Regulations require standardised, clear and accessible digital disclosures of key product features, terms and conditions, all applicable fees and charges (including recurring, transaction, and contingent fees) total costs where applicable, and material changes. The framework specifies the timing of disclosures (eg before purchase and upon changes), permits or requires digital delivery and provides supervisory oversight or enforcement for non-compliance. Channel Test - The framework requires disclosures to be delivered through the digital channel used by the consumer (eg, mobile app, website, digital wallet), in a format that is accessible before the consumer proceeds with the transaction, and compliance is subject to supervisory oversight or enforcement. To assign a 3, there must be evidence that the framework has been applied to actual digital product flows through a supervisory, licensing, or enforcement act directed at a named provider or an identified product flow; for example, a published supervisory review, an enforcement action, or a licensing condition applied in practice. A regulator's own guidance implementing its rule does not, by itself, discharge this requirement. A framework that nominally subjects firms to enforcement without a verifiable operationalization record scores 2.
Comprehensive, enforceable requirements established through Levels 1-3, supported where appropriate by supervisory guidance. A Level 4 source alone cannot justify a score of 3. To assign a 3, there must be evidence that the framework has been applied to actual digital product flows through a supervisory, licensing, or enforcement act directed at a named provider or an identified product flow; for example, a published supervisory review, an enforcement action, or a licensing condition applied in practice. A regulator's own guidance implementing its rule does not, by itself, discharge this requirement. A framework that nominally subjects firms to enforcement without a verifiable operationalization record scores 2.
Requirement applies consistently across all relevant regulated fintech provider categories offering the affected digital financial services, with any exclusions being explicitly risk based and proportionate. Coder note - common CPMC-1 applicability gaps: PSPs and general-purpose digital wallets (excluded from credit-era rules); BNPL providers (outside consumer credit regulation where interest is zero or deferred); crypto asset service providers (disclosure regimes enacted in few jurisdictions as of 2026); embedded finance/BaaS (obligation allocation between bank partner and fintech frontend frequently ambiguous). Where one of these is the binding constraint, name it in the evidence log. Risk-based exclusion: A score of 3 requires that any exclusions be 'explicitly risk-based and proportionate.' Coders should verify this means the regulator has published a rationale for the exclusion - not merely that the exclusion exists. An undocumented carve-out for a provider type is an unexplained gap, not a risk-based exclusion, and should score 2 not 3.
Effective Consumer Protection Outcome Consumers consistently receive standardized, timely, and channel appropriate disclosures of key product features, total costs, fees and material changes across all relevant digital financial services. Providers are subject to enforceable obligations, supervisory monitoring, and corrective action where disclosures are deficient.
Scoring paths
One path: the anchors apply to all approaches.
Primary evidence sources
level
1A
Regulator website innovation/fintech-hub pages; published pre-filing or pre-application meeting processes; engagement reports or logs documenting use by new and non-licensed entrants; published specifications for any SupTech-enabled digital intake portal or API-accessible submission mechanism.
1B
Laws or mandates establishing the engagement function's authority; documented cases where engagement led to a licensing, supervisory, or rulemaking outcome; escalation procedures; specifications or published descriptions of internal SupTech case-management or query-routing tools used by the engagement function.
1C
Published formal request procedures, no-action letter registries, interpretation or classification request processes; track record of published or accessible responses; published specifications for digital intake infrastructure; any machine-readable output formats or structured opinion registries.
1D
Published FAQs, guidance notes, thematic reviews, and annual engagement reports organized by topic and accessible through a searchable index; machine-readable guidance specifications, API-accessible rulebook documentation, or published roadmaps for machine-readable guidance; SupTech knowledge-management system documentation.
Edge cases & scoring notes
A named innovation hub without evidence of operational use by new or pre-licensed entrants (published cases, FAQs, engagement logs, or response-time data) scores no higher than 1. A SupTech-enabled digital intake portal without an accessible, open, and fintech-specific engagement function behind it does not by itself raise a score above 1. Pre-filing meetings available only on an entirely ad hoc and undocumented basis also score 1.
An engagement function that provides general information but cannot escalate queries to licensing or oversight divisions or influence regulatory outcomes scores no higher than 1 regardless of resourcing, branding, or internal technology tools deployed. SupTech tools that log incoming firm queries and routes them to a triage team, but has no documented pathway for escalating unresolved or substantively important queries to the operational divisions that hold regulatory authority, does not demonstrate connectivity in any meaningful sense and therefore would not raise the score above 1.
Specifically covers formal requests for a public or binding response to a specific regulatory question and is distinct from general engagement or pre-filing meetings scored under 1A. Where a formal request mechanism exists but documented response timelines are systematically missed by more than 100% of the stated period, or responses are non-public, score conservatively and document the de jure/de facto gap. A digital intake system for formal requests that does not produce a binding or publicly documented response does not by itself raise the score above 2.
A regulator that publishes ad hoc FAQs but has no documented process for systematically reviewing and converting recurring queries into organized, searchable guidance scores no higher than 1. The availability of machine-readable guidance can raise a score from 2 to 3 only where the underlying systematic publication process (the Score 3 trigger) is already in place; machine-readable format alone on an ad hoc basis does not qualify.
Cross-pillar boundary note
• Formal innovator-request mechanism: sits in both IEMI-1A and the IEMI-2 pathway. Proposal: IEMI-1 owns it, IEMI-2 cross-refers without re-scoring. • RegTech and SupTech (IEMI-1C and 1D) against testing infrastructure (IEMI-2B): live-testing platforms could be scored twice. Proposal: technology of engagement in IEMI-1, technology of testing in IEMI-2.
Aggregation rule
Sub-dimension scoring
The anchors are written per sub-dimension, so each score cell holds one labelled block for each. Sub-dimension weights within this indicator: IEMI-1A — [30%] IEMI-1B — [25%] IEMI-1C — [25%] IEMI-1D — [20%] The indicator carries 25% of the pillar; all four IEMI indicators are weighted equally.
Suggest an edit
Endorse a level
Cite this indicator
IEMI-1 retains its focus on whether effective, accessible, and connected channels exist for fintechs to engage with regulators, regardless of organizational structure. The existence of a formal innovation hub alone is insufficient.
IEMI-2
Path to Authorization
Sub-dim b
IEMI-2 assesses whether there is a clear, accessible, and proportionate route for firms to test and scale novel business models across the full spectrum. The framework treats authorization as the organizing category encompassing multiple mechanisms rather than privileging any single approach.
IEMI-2A
Regulatory Flexibility: the extent to which regulators can make can tailor requirements based on a case-by-case basis versus being constrained by statute.
IEMI-2B
Testing Mechanisms: availability and quality of mechanisms including sandboxes, no-action letters, graduated or tiered licensing regimes, omnibus powers, and letters of forbearance.
IEMI-2C
Graduating Pathways: clarity on what happens after testing or tiered license; the concern about sandboxes becoming dead ends was explicitly raised, referencing the concept of a "sandbox cul-de-sac" with no clear path forward.
IEMI-2D
Proportionality — whether selection criteria and entry requirements are reasonable relative to the size and scope of the firm.
IEMI-2E:
Inter-regulatory Coordination: how well regulators coordinate for business models requiring authorization across multiple regulatory domains, distinguishing between having mechanisms in place and operationally implementing that coordination function.
No meaningful consumer financial protection/ ambiguous protection. No laws or regulations that clearly protect consumers from unfair or deceptive marketing and sales practices in the distribution of digital financial products and services, including prohibitions on unfair and deceptive sales and marketing practices; and affirmative obligations to support consumer decision-making, such as disclosure of paid promotions. Includes general consumer protection laws where application to (digital) consumer financial products is very ambiguous. Channel Test: No/very ambiguous legal basis for redressing unfair or deceptive financial marketing and sales through digital channels.
No fintech provider is subject to the relevant legal or regulatory requirements.
Consumers lack meaningful protection from unfair or deceptive marketing and sales practices in the distribution of digital financial products and services.
Limited or fragmented consumer financial protection. Laws/regulations protect consumers from unfair or deceptive marketing and sales practices for digital financial products and providers, but coverage is narrow, indirect, fragmented (may apply only to specified products, providers/ intermediaries, distribution channels/stages and marketing practices), or primarily grounded in general consumer protection law rather than financial law. Technology-neutral binding requirements in financial or general consumer law are sufficient where they provide a clear, enforceable legal basis for addressing the relevant conduct. Channel Test: General consumer protection or some financial sector-specific consumer protection for unfair or deceptive digital financial marketing and sales practices, but coverage is limited, fragmented, or unclear.
Requirements apply only to a limited category of fintech providers or primarily to traditional financial institutions, excluding most fintech providers and digital/fintech distribution models.
Some binding protections exist, but consumers remain exposed to inconsistent or limited safeguards across products, providers, intermediaries, promoters, or digital channels.
Established consumer financial protection but with material gaps. Financial laws/regulations protect consumers from unfair and deceptive marketing and sales practices in digital financial product distribution across the principal regulated financial products, providers, intermediaries, digital distribution channels (web, mobile, social media) and stages (inc. advertising, targeting, comparison, recommendation, application, and sale). Includes provider conduct; sales incentives or conflicts where relevant; marketing performed through agents, promoters, affiliates, or other third parties. Includes both prohibitions on unfair and deceptive practice and affirmative obligations, such as disclosure of paid promotions, to improve consumer decision-making. But material gaps remain in coverage of providers/intermediaries, products, or distribution channels/stages coverage; supervisory guidance; enforcement mechanisms; affirmative duties (such as commission disclosure), or negative restrictions (such as prohibitions on deceptive conduct). Technology-neutral binding requirements are sufficient where they provide a clear enforceable legal basis for addressing the relevant conduct. Channel Test: Financial sector-specific consumer protections apply to unfair or deceptive digital financial marketing and sales across principal digital financial products, providers/ intermediaries, and distribution channel/stage, including authoritative application of tech-neutral financial conduct rules; but material gaps remain.
Binding requirements are established at Levels 1–3 and clearly reach material digital marketing or sales conduct, including where authoritative Level 4 guidance clarifies the application of technology-neutral rules to social media, financial influencers, affiliates, or other digital practices; but they are incomplete in scope, coverage, timing or digital application.
Requirements apply to several major fintech provider categories but exclude one or more significant categories without a clear risk-based justification.
Consumers are generally protected from unfair or deceptive marketing and sales practices in the distribution of digital financial products and services, but material gaps remain.
Comprehensive consumer financial protection. Financial laws/regulations protect consumers from unfair and deceptive marketing and sales practices in digital financial product distribution across the principal regulated financial products, providers, intermediaries, and distribution channels and stages. Regulatory framework includes both comprehensive prohibitions on unfair and deceptive sales and marketing practices and comprehensive affirmative obligations, such as disclosure of paid promotions, to support consumer decision-making; clear enforcement mechanisms; and supervisory guidance. Technology-neutral binding requirements provide a clear, enforceable legal basis for addressing the relevant conduct, and authoritative regulatory guidance establishes that those requirements extend to emerging digital practices. A score of 3 does not require a single omnibus law or regulation: multiple binding public laws or regulations may cumulatively satisfy the score where they form a coherent regulatory framework and leave no material coverage gaps across the principal financial products and distribution channels. Channel Test: Financial sector-specific consumer protections for unfair or deceptive digital financial marketing and sales across principal digital financial products, providers, intermediaries, distribution channels and stages, including authoritative application of tech-neutral rules. Publicly available or otherwise verifiable evidence that the framework is applied in practice, such as supervisory findings, enforcement actions, thematic reviews, digital interface assessments, market monitoring results, complaints analysis, consumer testing, or equivalent evidence.
Comprehensive, enforceable requirements established through Levels 1-3, supported where appropriate by supervisory guidance. A Level 4 source alone cannot justify a score of 3. Score 3 additionally requires publicly available or otherwise verifiable operational evidence that the binding framework has been applied to actual digital marketing or sales conduct, such as a published enforcement action, supervisory finding, or equivalent.
Requirements apply consistently across all relevant fintech provider categories engaged in the affected digital marketing, recommendation, distribution, or sales activities. Any exclusions are explicitly risk-based, proportionate, and supported by a documented or otherwise verifiable regulatory rationale.
Consumers receive consistent and effective protection throughout the digital financial marketing and sales journey, including, where relevant, safeguards against misleading claims, mis-selling, manipulative design, inappropriate targeting or steering, conflicted recommendations, and unfair third-party, finfluencer, or automated distribution practices. Operational effectiveness is demonstrated through publicly available or otherwise verifiable supervisory reviews, enforcement actions, digital interface assessments, market monitoring findings, or equivalent evidence.
Two paths on IEMI-2A only: regulator discretion, or statutory adaptation. All other sub-dimensions are single path.
Primary legislation granting exemption/waiver/no-action powers; sandbox/testing-mechanism rules and cohort reports; graduated-licensing regimes; regulator sandbox/testing webpages; published graduation criteria and case studies of firms that have graduated; inter-agency MOUs on cross-domain authorization coordination.
Legislated tiering and graduated regimes as instruments of statutory adaptation under 2A path (ii), parliamentary and annual-report funnel disclosures, licence registers cross-matched against cohort lists for conversion counts, authorisation gazettes carrying filing dates for computing observed clocks, and joint-case counts under coordination MoUs.
• Do not let the presence or absence of the word "sandbox" drive scoring; assess whether the underlying testing/authorization function described in 2B–2C is actually performed. • A testing mechanism with no public evidence of firms using it should score no higher than 1 on 2B, even if formally announced in law or regulation. • Where live testing operates as an entry mechanism rather than a graduation stage, record this explicitly in the evidence log and score 2B on the basis of its actual position in the jurisdiction's pathway, not on an assumed sandbox-then-live-testing sequence. • A never-exercised statutory power scores 1 on 2A path (i) regardless of breadth. Entrenched but unpublished supervisory practice scores only where instances are documented; undocumented practice is recorded as unscored with an evidence-not-reasonably-available flag, not as zero. • With relation to 2B: if the sandbox is dormant but open, see the dormancy rule above. Closed sandboxes with no entries score 0. If the sandbox or the nation has a ‘thin-market’ i.e., open documented path, few applicants, then score on the credible-account rule. • Record de jure and de facto clocks together. Where the observed median from complete filing to first substantive decision exceeds twice the published window, cap the affected sub-dimension at 2 and log both figures. • Cross-agency coordination is N/A only where a single authority holds all financial regulatory regimes. Coordination across statutory regimes inside an integrated regulator is always assessed on 2E.
Sub-dimension scoring. The anchors are written per sub-dimension, so each score cell holds one labelled block for each. Sub-dimension weights within this indicator: IEMI-2A — 25% IEMI-2B — 25% IEMI-2C — 25% IEMI-2D — 10% IEMI-2E — 15% The indicator carries 25% of the pillar; all four IEMI indicators are weighted equally.
IEMI-2 assesses whether there is a clear, accessible, and proportionate route for firms to test and scale novel business models across the full spectrum. The framework treats authorization as the organizing category encompassing multiple mechanisms rather than privileging any single approach.
IEMI-3
Open Finance and Data Infrastructure
Sub-dim C
IEMI-3 assesses whether the regulatory and legislative environment supports open data sharing and interoperability across financial services. IEMI-3 is fundamentally different from others because it depends heavily on a legislative mandate rather than purely regulatory attitude or discretion.
IEMI-3A:
Legislative Foundation: whether data sharing is enabled at the legislative level.
IEMI-3B
Scope: the breadth of financial services covered.
IEMI-3C
Incentive Mechanisms: an important distinction exists between access pricing and revenue sharing; revenue sharing implies value-based pricing where a percentage of revenue must be shared, which is fundamentally different from recovering the cost of access. One participant specifically asked whether this sub-dimension addresses whether financial institutions can charge for data access and whether that is viewed favorably or unfavorably.
No structured redress. No regulatory provisions require financial institutions to maintain a complaints-handling function, observe defined response or resolution timeframes, or provide consumers with a route to independent review of digital finance complaints. Channel Test - No requirements reference digital channels or electronic submission/tracking of complaints.
No consumer protection outcome. Consumers have no guaranteed route to have a digital finance complaint answered or escalated; no binding regulatory obligation exists.
Basic complaints rules; unclear escalation; limited coverage. Institutions may be required to accept and log complaints, but there are no binding response or resolution deadlines, no defined escalation pathway beyond the institution, and/or coverage is limited to certain products, providers or non-digital contexts. Channel Test - Regulations do not require complaint submission or status tracking to be available through the same digital channel used to purchase or manage the product (permits, but does not require, electronic submission).
Applicability rating — Requirement applies only to a limited provider category or only to traditional financial institutions, excluding most fintech providers.
Limited Consumer Protection Outcome. Some consumers can complain and receive a response, but escalation is inconsistent, deadlines are absent or unenforced, and coverage is fragmented (e.g., certain products, providers or channels only). Consumers cannot reasonably expect a timely answer or independent review across digital financial services.
Established complaints + escalation mechanisms; some gaps for fintechs. Binding rules require an internal complaints function with defined response and resolution timeframes, and consumers have access to at least one public escalation route (a regulator complaint channel, a state-run online dispute-resolution platform, or small-claims court) below the institution. However, there is no independent ADR/ombudsman scheme with decisional authority binding on the firm, and/or the regime does not extend consistently to fintech, BNPL or crypto-asset providers. Channel Test - Digital submission of complaints is required for some products/providers but is not consistently required across all digital interfaces.
Binding requirements found in Levels 1-3 establishing internal complaints handling and response/resolution deadlines, but incomplete in scope, coverage, digital accessibility, or lacking a binding independent ADR/ombudsman layer (or documented functional equivalent).
Requirement applies to several major fintech provider categories but excludes one or more significant categories without a clear risk-based justification.
Functional Consumer Protection Outcome. Most consumers obtain an answered complaint within a defined deadline at no cost and can escalate through a free public channel (regulator complaint channel, state-run ODR platform, or accessible small-claims court). Binding third-party adjudication, however, is unavailable, slower, or outcome-variable, because no independent ADR/ombudsman scheme with decisional authority (or documented functional equivalent) exists.
Mature system: clear timeframes, independent ADR/ombudsman coverage, digital accessibility, published process. Regulations require: (i) a numeric deadline for initial response and final resolution, with any extension both individually justified and capped as a share of monthly complaint volume; (ii) an independent ADR scheme or ombudsman with decisional authority binding on the firm, with express coverage of digital/fintech payment providers, OR a demonstrated functional equivalent meeting the private-law-substitution test below; (iii) digital accessibility of complaint submission and status tracking within the channel the product was purchased or used; and (iv) published, institution-level process and outcome data (response times, volumes, resolution/upheld rates) enabling public verification. Channel Test - The framework requires complaint submission and tracking to be available through the digital channel used by the consumer, and compliance is subject to supervisory oversight or enforcement. Evidence of at least one supervisory review, published complaint ranking, or ADR case-outcome record demonstrating the framework operates in practice is required to assign a score of 3. A framework that nominally provides these rights without a verifiable operationalization record scores 2. NOTE - Private-law-substitution test: where no independent ADR/ombudsman with decisional authority exists, a free, digitally accessible, small-claims (or equivalent) court pathway below a defined value threshold, requiring no filing fee, available for online filing, and not requiring mandatory legal representation, may be treated as a functional equivalent. This is an anchor-sensitivity decision for plenary; coders should record in the evidence log which reading was applied and flag the case as a close call where the score turns on it.
Comprehensive, enforceable requirements established through Levels 1-3, covering internal handling, numeric deadlines, an independent ADR/ombudsman with decisional authority (or documented functional equivalent), and digital accessibility, supported where appropriate by supervisory guidance. A Level 4 source alone cannot justify a score of 3. Score 3 additionally requires evidence that the framework has been applied in practice - through published complaint rankings, published quality evaluations, ADR/ombudsman case-outcome statistics, or equivalent supervisory record.
Requirement applies consistently across all relevant regulated Fintech Provider categories offering the affected digital financial services, with any exclusions being explicitly risk-based and proportionate. Coder note - common CPMC-3 applicability gaps: unlicensed fintech front-ends and merchant-funded BNPL/installment providers (frequently outside the regulated ombudsman perimeter); crypto-asset service providers (complaint-handling duties extended in few jurisdictions as of 2026); embedded finance/BaaS arrangements (ambiguity over which entity owns the complaint). Where one of these is the binding constraint, name it in the evidence log. Risk-based exclusion: A score of 3 requires that any exclusions be 'explicitly risk-based and proportionate.' Coders should verify this means the regulator has published a rationale for the exclusion - not merely that the exclusion exists. An undocumented carve-out for a provider type is an unexplained gap, not a risk-based exclusion, and should score 2 not 3.
Effective Consumer Protection Outcome. Consumers consistently obtain a timely, defined-deadline response and can escalate free of charge to an independent ADR/ombudsman scheme (or documented functional equivalent) with decisional authority binding on the firm and express coverage of digital/fintech providers. Response and resolution data are published at institution level, and providers are subject to supervisory monitoring and corrective action where complaint handling is deficient.
Open-finance/open-banking primary legislation and implementing regulations; technical standard specifications (API schemas, data dictionaries); governance-body rules, charters, and participant registers; regulator statements or rules on access pricing and revenue sharing; published lists of participating institutions and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
• Distinguish read-only data-sharing APIs from write/payment-initiation APIs; where a regime's maturity differs by API type, record in the evidence log which capability was scored. • Do not conflate data-portability rules (e.g. account-switching mechanics, prepayment fees) with open finance; only data-sharing and interoperability elements are scored under IEMI-3 (see Section 1, Out of Scope). • Do not treat revenue-sharing (value-based pricing on a percentage of revenue) as equivalent to cost-recovery access pricing when scoring the incentive-mechanisms sub-dimension; note explicitly which model the jurisdiction has adopted. • A jurisdiction with mature technical standards and governance but no legislative mandate for data sharing (3A remains at 0 or 1) should not score above 1–2 on the overall indicator, reflecting the legislative-dependency noted above.
Direct
Sub-dimension scoring. The anchors are written per sub-dimension, so each score cell holds one labelled block for each. Sub-dimension weights within this indicator: IEMI-3A — 30% IEMI-3B — 40% IEMI-3C — 30% The indicator carries 25% of the pillar; all four IEMI indicators are weighted equally.
IEMI-4
Digital Onboarding and eKYC Enablement
Sub-dim D
IEMI-4 measures whether the regulatory and legislative framework supports remote onboarding and modern identity verification for regulated financial services. The group agreed to retain this as a standalone indicator.
IEMI-4A
Legislative Foundation: whether primary legislation supports digital identity as a legally valid basis for financial services onboarding, noting that strong regulatory guidance without legislative foundation exposes the framework to legal challenges.
IEMI-4B
Regulatory Acceptance: whether regulators explicitly accept digital methods for onboarding regulated customers with published standards or guidance.
IEMI-4C
Risk-Based Approach: whether the framework permits proportionate and tiered verification calibrated to transaction risk rather than requiring uniform high standards across all use cases.
IEMI-4D
Interoperability: whether digital identity profiles can be ported and recognized across different financial service providers and regulatory domains. One jurisdiction example illustrated how different technology standards between regulatory authorities created complications for mobile money customer verification in practice.
IEMI-4E
Coverage and Exclusion Safeguard: whether the accepted identity sources and verification pathways cover the population universally, rather than depending on a single identity system, and whether a statutory fallback or alternative verification route exists so that individuals lacking primary identity documents, or affected by identity-linked account limitations, are not excluded from financial services. A single national ID is not required—multiple accepted sources may combine to achieve coverage— but exclusion effects must be actively monitored and remedied.
IEMI-4F
Privacy and Data-protection Governance: whether a data-protection law is enacted and operationally in force, backed by an institutionally independent supervisory authority with an active enforcement record that extends to identity data, governing how personal and identity information collected is handled and protected.
No clear framework No binding legal or regulatory framework allocates liability for unauthorized transactions or digital payment fraud. Consumers have no defined dispute pathway or statutory protection specific to digital payments. Channel Test: No digital payment-specific requirements.
No regulated fintech providers covered.
Consumers have no predictable protection against digital payment fraud.
Partial framework Binding rules address certain forms of unauthorized transactions or payment fraud, but liability allocation remains unclear or inconsistent across providers, payment types or digital channels. Authentication expectations or dispute mechanisms are limited. Channel Test: Fraud reporting or dispute processes are largely offline or not consistently available through digital payment channels.
Only Level 4 guidance exists, or binding rules cover only limited payment products, providers or channels.
Applies primarily to traditional banks or only one provider category.
Some protections exist, but liability and dispute outcomes remain inconsistent and uncertain.
Established framework Binding rules clearly allocate liability for unauthorized transactions and establish a structured dispute process. Providers are subject to authentication and fraud management requirements, but important gaps remain (for example APP scam liability, digital dispute handling, ecosystem coordination or operational implementation). Channel Test: Digital reporting or dispute mechanisms exist for some providers or payment channels, but are not consistently mandated across all regulated digital payment providers.
Binding requirements exist in Levels 1 - 3 but remain incomplete in scope, digital implementation, liability allocation or operational processes.
Applies to several major fintech provider categories but excludes one or more significant provider types without a published risk-based justification.
Consumers generally benefit from clear unauthorized transaction protections and structured dispute mechanisms, although significant gaps remain for APP scams, digital reporting or operational implementation.
Comprehensive, operational digital fraud framework Binding rules establish: clear liability allocation for both unauthorized transactions and authorized push payment scams; binding fraud prevention and authentication requirements (e.g. MFA, behavioural monitoring, device controls, transaction risk management); operational dispute handling embedded within the same digital payment channel used by the consumer; defined investigation, fund preservation and resolution timeframes; ecosystem-level fraud intelligence or information-sharing mechanisms where applicable; and demonstrated supervisory oversight through published enforcement actions, supervisory reviews, operational statistics or equivalent evidence. Channel Test: Consumers can report and manage fraud directly through the digital payment channel (mobile app, wallet, internet banking, etc.) used to initiate the payment, with compliance subject to supervisory oversight. Operationalisation requirement: A score of 3 requires evidence that the framework has been applied in practice through published supervisory findings, enforcement actions, scheme statistics, fraud recovery data or equivalent operational evidence.
Comprehensive binding requirements established through Levels 1 - 3, supported by demonstrated supervisory implementation including enforcement actions, supervisory reviews, operational statistics or published scheme outcomes.
Applies consistently across all relevant regulated providers offering digital payment services, including banks, PSPs, e-money issuers and other applicable providers, with any exclusions being explicitly documented, proportionate and risk-based.
Consumers benefit from an end-to-end fraud protection framework covering prevention, authentication, liability allocation, digital dispute handling, ecosystem coordination and supervisory oversight, resulting in consistent and predictable consumer outcomes across digital payment services.
AML/KYC primary legislation; eKYC-specific regulatory guidance, circulars, or rulebooks; risk-based customer due-diligence guidance; digital-identity/eKYC frameworks and standards; FATF-aligned guidance references; published reliance/interoperability rules between regulated entities. Commencement instruments and live litigation on identity statutes, KYC registries and reliance rules as identity-portability instruments, which is distinct from financial-data portability, registrar dashboards read against the World Bank ID4D and Findex series on a standardised denominator, UN World Population Prospects, age 15 and above, capped at 100 per cent, registration totals rather than credentials issued, and data-protection enforcement registers and authority-design instruments.
Replace subjective language such as "strong fraud protection" with objective requirements, including:
• Reliance on another institution's KYC does not relieve the onboarding entity of final due-diligence responsibility; score 4D on whether anything prohibits using that information as an input, not on whether reliance is mandatory or common practice. • Do not score emerging-market foundational digital-ID systems more favourably than advanced-economy sectoral eKYC approaches solely because they are more centralized; assess functional equivalence—can a customer be onboarded with confidence, however that is achieved? • Where regulatory guidance on digital onboarding is strong but has no legislative backing, cap the score at 2 on 4A, per the framework's legislative-foundation threshold in Section 2. • Account-aggregation and account-switching frameworks are financial-data portability and are not citable under 4. • Exclusion evidence must count against 4E even where enrolment is high. Examples of exclusions include but are not limited to account freezes at scale, sole-ID cliffs without fallback, and live constitutional litigation or challenge to established law or procedure.
• Identity portability against data portability: IEMI-4D scores identity reuse and reliance; account-aggregation and account-switching are financial-data portability (IEMI-3 or out of scope). Needs a recorded Section 7 row with the IEMI-3 leads. • Aggregation: Section 6's simple average sits uneasily with the template's own binding-constraint note for IEMI-3A and cap-at-2 note for IEMI-4A, and ordinal scores do not support averaging. Proposal: highest band whose conditions are met, subject to the stated caps, as the common method across indicators.
Sub-dimension scoring. The anchors are written per sub-dimension, so each score cell holds one labelled block for each. Sub-dimension weights within this indicator: IEMI-4A — 35% IEMI-4B — 15% IEMI-4C — 15% IEMI-4D — 15% IEMI-4E — 10% IEMI-4F — 10% The indicator carries 25% of the pillar; all four IEMI indicators are weighted equally.
IEMI-4 measures whether the regulatory and legislative framework supports remote onboarding and modern identity verification for regulated financial services. The group agreed to retain this as a standalone indicator.
FRAMING NOTE
Sub-dimensions are designed to assess distinct and independently scorable aspects of the regulatory communication environment. Note that 1A (general regulator accessibility and pre-filing meetings) and 1C (formal requests for a specific public or binding opinion) are intentionally distinct: 1A captures the breadth of access to the regulator; 1C captures the existence of a formal right to a documented response to a specific question. 1E is scored N/A in jurisdictions with a single genuinely integrated regulator; document the basis for any N/A designation. RegTech and SupTech elements appear within multiple sub-dimensions as features of implementation quality rather than as standalone scored items: SupTech-enabled intake and case-routing tools are evidence of operational infrastructure in 1A and 1B; a digital formal request mechanism with structured outputs is a higher-order implementation of 1C; machine-readable or API-accessible guidance is the most advanced form of knowledge publication in 1D; and shared SupTech platforms underpinning inter-agency data sharing represent the highest tier of multi-agency coordination in 1E. In each case, RegTech and SupTech features raise a score within the sub-dimension where the relevant function is already operational—they do not substitute for the underlying function. A regulator may deploy SupTech tools internally while providing little public benefit from engagement (high 1B, low 1D) or vice versa; each sub-dimension should be scored independently.
IEMI-1A: Regulator accessibility: No dedicated channel for fintech-sector engagement; regulatory access available only to established licensed firms through standard supervisory channels; no published route for pre-licensed or early-stage entrants; no mechanism for pre-filing meetings or informal pre-application engagement; no digital or technology-enabled intake for engagement requests. No evidence of proactive, regulator-initiated engagement with industry. IEMI-1B: Regulatory connectivity: No dedicated innovation or engagement function; regulatory access handled through standard supervisory or licensing channels with no fintech-specific routing or authority; engagement cannot influence regulatory outcomes; no technology tools in use to route or track engagement queries internally. IEMI-1C: Formal determination request mechanism: No mechanism for a firm to formally request a regulatory opinion, interpretation, or classification on a specific question about a novel business model; regulatory responses to specific firm questions are entirely at the regulator’s discretion with no published process, timeline, or response obligation; submissions must be made through generic correspondence channels with no dedicated intake. IEMI-1D: Feedback loop and knowledge publication: Regulator does not publish guidance, FAQs, or thematic reviews in response to recurring firm queries; all engagement outputs are confidential or case-specific with no public benefit; firms seeking regulatory clarity must engage individually with no accumulated public knowledge base; no machine-readable or structured regulatory guidance exists.
IEMI-1A: Regulator accessibility: A “general inquiries” channel exists but has no dedicated innovation or fintech function; access is in practice limited to firms that are narrowly defined; pre-filing or pre-application engagement is available only on an ad hoc and undocumented basis with no published eligibility criteria or process; any digital intake is generic rather than fintech-specific and does not route to an innovation-centric team. Limited evidence of proactive, regulator-initiated engagement with industry. IEMI-1B: Regulatory connectivity: A dedicated function or team exists on paper but operates as a communications or PR layer with no documented authority over or structural connection to licensing, oversight, or enforcement divisions; outcomes of engagement are not fed back into regulatory decisions or rulemaking; any internal technology tools used are generic workflow systems rather than purpose-built SupTech for engagement management. IEMI-1C: Formal determination request mechanism: A mechanism exists in principle (e.g., formal inquiry procedure or guidance request process) but responses are discretionary, non-binding, and unpublished with no committed timelines; firms have no documented right to a response; any submission process is paper-based or uses generic email/communication infrastructure rather than a dedicated digital intake; the mechanism is distinct from general engagement or pre-filing meetings. IEMI-1D: Feedback loop and knowledge publication: Regulator has published at least one FAQ, guidance note, or thematic review in response to industry queries, but this is ad hoc rather than systematic; no published process for converting recurring queries into public guidance; published outputs are not regularly updated or organized for searchability; no machine-readable or API-accessible format for published guidance.
IEMI-1A: Regulator accessibility: A dedicated innovation-centric engagement channel exists, whether an innovation office, hub, or liaison team, with a published scope and process; access is explicitly open to pre-licensed and early-stage entrants; pre-filing or pre-application meetings are available through a documented process; the channel may be supported by digital intake tool (e.g., an online application form, automated system, or a SupTech-enabled case-routing tool), though not strictly required. Evidence of proactive, regulator-initiated engagement with industry, but not on a systematic basis. IEMI-1B: Regulatory connectivity: The engagement function has demonstrable access to licensing and oversight divisions and can facilitate regulatory conversations across operational departments; authority is documented but may be informal; documented cases where engagement informs a licensing or supervisory outcome; the engagement function uses internal digital tools (e.g., Compliance Risk Management systems, case-management platforms, or SupTech dashboards) to route and track firm queries, though these need not be purpose-built for innovation engagement. IEMI-1C: Formal determination request mechanism: A formal request mechanism exists with a published process and committed timelines for a response to a specific regulatory question; responses are issued and a partial track record exists, though responses may not be binding or systematically published; the mechanism may be supported by a digital intake tool (e.g., an online submission form with automated acknowledgement) but responses are not machine-readable or structured for RegTech consumption. IEMI-1D: Feedback loop and knowledge publication: Regulator has a documented practice of converting recurring queries into published guidance, FAQs, or thematic reviews in at least one fintech-relevant domain; outputs are accessible and searchable through a published index or regulatory website; some evidence of periodic review and update; outputs are cited in at least one supervisory communication; guidance may be published in structured formats (e.g., HTML with tagged sections or a searchable database), though full machine-readability or API access is not yet in place.
IEMI-1A: Regulator accessibility: Open, published, and operationally evidenced engagement channel accessible to firms at all stages; pre-filing and pre-application meetings available through a formal, documented process with published service standards; track record of engagement by new and non-licensed entrants documents in published reports, FAQs, or engagement logs; channel is supported by SupTech-enabled digital intake infrastructure (e.g., dedicated online portal, automated case-routing, or an APO-accessible submission mechanism) that ensures consistent handling and auditability of all engagement requests regardless of firm size or licensing stage. Evidence of proactive, regulator-initiated engagement with industry on a systematic basis. IEMI-1B: Regulatory connectivity: Formal published mandate establishing the engagement function’s authority and structural connectivity to licensing, enforcement, and oversight divisions; documented cases where engagement led to a licensing, supervisory, or rulemaking outcome; engagement function has an explicit power to escalate unresolved queries internally and to initiate regulatory guidance or rulemaking in response to recurring issues; the function deploys SupTech tools purpose-built for innovation engagement (e.g., a dedicated case-management or query-routing system with structured data fields, audit trails, and escalation workflows) enabling consistent, auditable handling of firm queries and systematic identification of recurring regulatory issues for policy follow-up. IEMI-1C: Formal determination request mechanism: A published, formal right for firms to request a regulatory opinion or interpretation on a specific question about a novel business model; binding or publicly documented response obligation with committed timelines; systematic publication of outcomes through a searchable registry of published opinions and interpretations; evidence of routine use across a range of firm types and business models; the mechanism is supported by a dedicated digital intake with structured data fields enabling SupTech-assisted routing, tracking, and response management; published opinions are issued in a structured or machine-readable format enabling RegTech-assisted compliance analysis, or the regulator has committed to a roadmap for doing so. IEMI-1D: Feedback loop and knowledge publication: Systematic, published process for converting recurring regulatory queries into public guidance, FAQs, thematic reviews, or rulemaking; guidance is updated on a defined schedule or in response to market developments; outputs are organized, searchable, and regularly cited in supervisory communications; regulator publishes annual or periodic engagement reports documenting themes, outcomes, and regulatory responses; firms can obtain regulatory clarity from published outputs without individual engagement in a majority of recurring scenarios; at least a subset of published regulatory guidance is available in a machine-readable or API-accessible format enabling RegTech-assisted compliance mapping, or the regulator has published a roadmap and timeline for achieving this; a SupTech-enabled knowledge-management system is used internally to tag, version-control, and cross-reference published guidance outputs.
Sub-dim B
The term "sandbox" is used inconsistently across jurisdictions and should not by itself determine scoring; score the underlying testing function actually performed. Live testing may carry a scoring premium over traditional controlled sandboxes given the infrastructure and support it requires, and may function as an entry mechanism in its own right rather than solely as a later graduation stage—users should note in the evidence log which role live testing plays in the jurisdiction scored.
IEMI-2A, path (i): Regulator discretion: no discretionary power to modify or promulgate requirements, grant exemptions, or provide relief for novel models. Every accommodation requires new primary legislation. IEMI-2A, path (ii): Statutory adaptation: the legislature and regulator have not adapted requirements to novel models and no adaptation is in progress. IEMI-2B: Testing mechanisms: no testing or transitional mechanism exists in law or in practice. IEMI-2C: Graduating pathways: no route out of testing. Exit is undefined (the sandbox cul-de-sac). IEMI-2D: Proportionality: a single full-scale license is the only entry. All firms subject to identical requirements despite varied business models and actual risks. IEMI-2E: Inter-regulatory coordination: cross-domain models face sequential, uncoordinated gates. No mechanism exists.
IEMI-2A, path (i): Regulator discretion: a waiver, exemption, or no-action power exists on paper with no exercise, or one or two contested uses. A never-exercised power scores 1 regardless of its breadth. IEMI-2A, path (ii): Statutory adaptation: legislated or regulatory tiering or graduated regimes proposed, or enacted but not in force, or in force without operational guidance. IEMI-2B: Testing mechanisms: a mechanism is announced or legislated with no admitted participant, or is dormant (no admission or live application within the look-back window caps this sub-dimension at 1). IEMI-2C: Graduating pathways: exit criteria unpublished or wholly discretionary. No documented conversion to authorization or next tier. IEMI-2D: Proportionality: proportionate entry announced or piloted. Fees or capital floors still exclude early-stage firms in practice. IEMI-2E: Inter-regulatory coordination: an MoU or committee exists with no evidenced joint case. Alternatively a de facto inter-regulatory coordination in the absence of documentation.
IEMI-2A, path (i): Regulator discretion: a documented power exercised on multiple occasions for novel business models, with scope or duration of relief constrained by statute or not broadly applied across the market. IEMI-2A, path (ii): Statutory adaptation: legislated tiering or graduated regimes in force with early documented use by firms. IEMI-2B: Testing mechanisms: at least one mechanism operational: admitted firms, live-customer testing available, published rules. The application and admission funnel is at least partly published. IEMI-2C: Graduating pathways: published exit criteria and at least one documented conversion to authorization or next tier, or published criteria plus a credible account of why conversions are few despite an open path. IEMI-2D: Proportionality: at least one proportionate tier operational (reduced capital, fees, or scope) with documented use by small or early-stage firms. IEMI-2E: Inter-regulatory coordination: a standing mechanism with at least one completed joint case. For integrated regulators, documented handling of cross-domain models across internal statutory regimes.
IEMI-2A, path (i): Regulator discretion: broad documented powers used routinely, evidenced by multiple public instances across different business models within the look-back window and broadly applied across the market. IEMI-2A, path (ii): Statutory adaptation: legislated adaptation routinely used across model types, supported by regulator-issued operational guidance. IEMI-2B: Testing mechanisms: recurring intake under published rules with a published funnel (applications and admissions), live testing available, and observed processing within twice the published window. Volume is evidence, not the object: a thin market with an open, documented path satisfies this level on the credible-account rule. IEMI-2C: Graduating pathways: published criteria with multiple named conversions, or published conversion pathway(s), or graduation to next tier, and observed exit-to-authorization time within twice the published window. IEMI-2D: Proportionality: graduated requirements across the whole pathway, published fee and capital schedules calibrated to risk, and documented early-stage use. IEMI-2E: Inter-regulatory coordination: a single-entry mechanism or statutory coordination duty operating routinely, with a published joint caseload and/or decisions from inter-departmental working groups.
IEMI-3 depends heavily on legislative mandate rather than purely regulatory attitude or discretion, so users should expect the legislative-foundation sub-dimension (3A) to be a binding constraint on the overall indicator score: a jurisdiction cannot score 3 overall on the strength of technical standards or governance alone (3C–3E) without a legislative basis for data sharing (3A). Architectural choices (e.g., centralized vs decentralized infrastructure, mandated vs voluntary standards) should not be scored more or less favorably in themselves provided the jurisdiction achieves equivalent functional outcomes (architectural neutrality). Definition(s) of eligible data sharing are important here: credit reference agencies or credit bureaus operate data sharing within regulatory regimes—but that is not what is envisioned here. Needs to be clear this is a legal requirement on data holders in financial services to share data, if requested with consumer consent, with a third party or another financial service provider. Questions of regulatory/legal implementation and technical standards and governance implementation need to be separated out. How do we apply scope to each of the other criteria: eg you could have a high score for open banking in all categories but a zero score for any other type of open finance? Legislative mandate could include use of existing general competition or data protection powers by a regulator.
IEMI-3A: Legislative foundation: no primary legislation or binding legal mandate enables data sharing in financial services (where the data holder is a financial services provider, and the data is shared, with customer consent, with a third party or another financial services provider; any data sharing that occurs is purely voluntary and unregulated. IEMI-3B: Scope: no datasets or data related to specific financial services or products have been mandated for data sharing. IEMI-3C: Incentive mechanisms: participation is voluntary; bilateral or multilateral arrangements are subject to commercial negotiation; no regulatory involvement in pricing or data access.
IEMI-3A: Legislative foundation: legislation enabling data sharing has been proposed or is under consultation, or a legal basis exists but with no accompanying regulatory implementation. Further secondary legislation or regulatory consultation may be required or is planned. IEMI-3B: Scope: one financial product or service or a limited dataset related to one is mandated (e.g. ‘open banking’ where bank current account / checking account data is covered). IEMI-3C: Incentive mechanisms: data holders with significant market power may be designated/mandated to participate; non-designated firms may participate on a reciprocal basis. The regulator is consulting on proposals or principles for access charges and/or has indicated they will make a regulatory ruling if requested by one or more firms.
IEMI-3A: Legislative foundation: Primary legislation or statutory requirement enabling data sharing has been enacted and is in force. Implementing regulations, finalised. IEMI-3B: Scope: ‘Two or more distinct types of regulated financial services are in scope: eg two or more of checking accounts, savings, pensions, lending, insurance and/or business as well as consumer markets. IEMI-3C: Incentive mechanisms: All regulated firms for relevant data sets are required to participate. The regulator has published clear guidance and rules on access and pricing: these may be based on FRAND principles (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) and may specify free, cost recovery, or cost plus for different types of data and services.
IEMI-3A: Legislative Foundation: primary legislation enabling data sharing is enacted, in force, and fully operationalized with demonstrable monitoring and supervision of delivery and performance. This may include regulator-issued guidance. IEMI-3B: Scope: all regulated financial services are covered by data sharing. IEMI-3C: Incentive Mechanisms: regulatory policy recognises and embeds open finance solutions, e.g., regulator explicitly makes open finance a part of its approach to AI, financial inclusion or credit information market; and requires any new financial infrastructure or extension of perimeter to apply open finance at outset.
• Distinguish read-only data-sharing APIs from write/payment-initiation APIs; where a regime's maturity differs by API type, record in the evidence log which capability was scored. • Do not conflate data-portability rules (e.g. account-switching mechanics, prepayment fees) with open finance; only data-sharing and interoperability elements are scored under IEMI-3 (see Section 1, Out of Scope). • Do not treat revenue-sharing (value-based pricing on a percentage of revenue) as equivalent to cost-recovery access pricing when scoring 3D; note explicitly which model the jurisdiction has adopted. • A jurisdiction with mature technical standards and governance (3C–3E) but no legislative mandate for data sharing (3A remains at 0 or 1) should not score above 1–2 on the overall indicator, reflecting the legislative-dependency noted above.
The indicator is framed around digital onboarding and eKYC broadly, not around foundational national digital-identity systems, so as not to favor emerging-market models over advanced-economy sectoral approaches. The key question for every sub-dimension is whether a customer can be digitally onboarded with the same level of confidence as physical onboarding, regardless of the method used (consistent with FATF's 2015 digital-onboarding guidance). Whether to place a scoring premium on KYC-reliance frameworks (4D) as an aspirational marker beyond current common practice remains an open question for the Working Group; until resolved, score 4D on the objective triggers below without an additional premium.
IEMI-4A: Legislative foundation: no primary legislation recognises digital identity or digital evidence as a legally valid basis for onboarding. Onboarding is legally required to be in-person or paper-based. IEMI-4B: Regulatory acceptance: Regulators do not accept digital methods. Face-to-face verification is mandated. IEMI-4C: Risk-based approach: uniform high-standard verification is required for all customers and use cases. IEMI-4D: Interoperability and reliance: identity verification is siloed per institution. Reliance on another institution's verification is prohibited. IEMI-4E: Coverage and exclusion safeguards: the identity sources the framework accepts cover a minority of adults, or identity-linked account freezes operate at scale without remedy. IEMI-4F: Privacy and data-protection governance: No data-protection law.
IEMI-4A: Legislative foundation: Primary legislation is silent, and digital onboarding rests solely on regulatory guidance with no clear statutory basis, exposing firms to legal-challenge risk. IEMI-4B: Regulatory acceptance: Acceptance exists in a pilot or in narrow guidance covering a limited product or institution set. IEMI-4C: Risk-based approach: Tiered verification proposed, or confined to a narrow product set. IEMI-4D: Interoperability and reliance: Portability or reliance announced, or limited to a single corridor or provider pair. IEMI-4E: Coverage and exclusion safeguards: Combined coverage is partial or contested (live litigation over the identity base), or a sole-ID rule operates without a fallback route. IEMI-4F: Privacy and data-protection governance: A law is enacted but substantive obligations are not in force, or no operational authority exists, or there is no enforcement record.
IEMI-4A: Legislative foundation: Primary legislation explicitly permits digital identity evidence for financial services onboarding, with implementing detail left to guidance which may be incomplete. IEMI-4B: Regulatory acceptance: Published standards or guidance with regulated institutions live on the digital route. IEMI-4C: Risk-based approach: Tiered customer due diligence operational with published thresholds. IEMI-4D: Interoperability and reliance: Registry-based reuse or orchestrator or certified-provider or federation operating across some providers or regulatory domains. IEMI-4E: Coverage and exclusion safeguards: Combined coverage of accepted sources reaches most adults on the standardised denominator, fallback routes exist, and exclusion effects are monitored. IEMI-4F: Privacy and data-protection governance: The law is in force with an operational authority. The enforcement record is thin.
IEMI-4A: Legislative foundation: Primary legislation comprehensively establishes digital identity as legally valid for onboarding, fully supported by implementing regulatory guidance. IEMI-4B: Regulatory acceptance: Verification methods enumerated in a binding instrument, with documented at-scale use across institution classes. IEMI-4C: Risk-based approach: Tiering embedded with published usage data, consistent with the proportionality standard of FATF Recommendation 1 as amended in February 2025. IEMI-4D: Interoperability and reliance: Cross-provider and cross-domain recognition operating routinely, with published volumes or published reliance rules. Score on identity-portability instruments; financial-data portability sits with IEMI-3. IEMI-4E: Coverage and exclusion safeguards: Near-universal combined coverage, a statutory fallback or alternative verification route, and no unremedied mass-exclusion event within the look-back window. A single national ID is not required: multiple accepted sources count in combination. IEMI-4F: Privacy and data-protection governance: The law is in force with an institutionally independent authority and an active enforcement record that includes identity data.
AML/KYC primary legislation; eKYC-specific regulatory guidance, circulars, or rulebooks; risk-based customer due-diligence guidance; digital-identity/eKYC frameworks and standards; FATF-aligned guidance references; published reliance/interoperability rules between regulated entities, Commencement instruments and live litigation on identity statutes, KYC registries and reliance rules as identity-portability instruments, which is distinct from financial-data portability, registrar dashboards read against the World Bank ID4D and Findex series on a standardised denominator, UN World Population Prospects, age 15 and above, capped at 100 per cent, registration totals rather than credentials issued, and data-protection enforcement registers and authority-design instruments.
• Identity portability against data portability: IEMI-4D scores identity reuse and reliance; account-aggregation and account-switching are financial-data portability (IEMI-3 or out of scope). Needs a recorded Section 7 row with the IEMI-3 leads. • Aggregation: Section 6's simple average sits uneasily with the template's own binding-constraint note for IEMI-3A and cap-at-2 note for IEMI-4A, and ordinal scores do not support averaging. Proposal: highest band whose conditions are met, subject to the stated caps, as the common method across indicators.
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